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INTRODUCTION

For more than twenty-five years, a significant component of the
scholarly commentary on insurance law has focused on the so-called
"reasonable expectations doctrine"' enunciated by then-Professor (now
Judge) Robert Keeton in his justly celebrated 1970 article.2 The reasonable
expectations principle made a seemingly sudden emergence with the
appearance of Keeton's article and has held particular attraction to
academics 3 while simultaneously prompting resistance from elements of

1. I say "so-called" because the reasonable expectations perspective is often referred to as
a "doctrine," even by its "creator" Judge Keeton. However, my own view is that reasonable
expectations analysis is most appropriately viewed as an approach to the interpretation of insurance
contracts rather than a firm "doctrine." See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OFINSURANCE
CoNTRACrS ch. 11 (1994).
2. See Robert E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variancewith Policy Provisions(pt. 1),
83 HARV. L. REv. 961,967 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-MadeLaw andJudge-MadeInsurance:Honoring
the ReasonableExpectationsofthe Insured,67 VA.L. REV. 1151 (1981); Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrineof ReasonableExpectations in InsuranceLaw After Two Decades, 51 OHIO. ST. L.J. 823
(1990); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986);
Symposium, The DoctrineofReasonableExpectationsAfter Three Decades,4 CONN. INS. L.J. _
(forthcoming 1998) (featuring articles by Professors Kenneth Abraham, James Fischer, Roger
Henderson, Robert Jerry, Mark Rahdert, Jeffrey Stempel, and Jeffrey Thomas, and by prominent
insurance coverage attorneys Eugene Anderson and Susan Popik).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the reasonable expectations doctrine generated considerable
commentary. In addition to the sources already cited in this Article, there were a number of shorter
articles and student notes in the wake of Keeton's Rights at Variance article. See, e.g., (in
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the bench and bar, and particularly from the insurance industry.4 The

chronological order), Harry F. Perlet III, The InsuranceContractand the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectation, 6 FORUM 116 (1971); Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 252 (1971); E. Neil Young et al., Insurance Contract
Interpretation:Issues and Trends, 625 INS. L.J. 71, 73, 78-81 (Feb. 1975) (reviewing approaches
to insurance policy construction and identifying reasonable expectations doctrine as a separate
school of thought); Chad DeLuc, Note, Insurance Contractand Policy-Doctrineof Reasonable
ExpectationsApplied to Void a Crop Spraying Exclusion, 53 N.D. L. REV. 613 (1977); Frank E.
Gardner, ReasonableExpectations:Evolution Completedor Revolution Begun?, 669 INS. L.J. 573
(1978); Martin Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1977-78); William M. Lashner, Note, A Common Law
Alternativeto the DoctrineofReasonableExpectationsin the ConstructionoflnsuranceContracts,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982); Scott B. Krider, Note, The ReconstructionofInsurance Contracts
Under the Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations,18 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 155 (1984); William A.
Mayhew, ReasonableExpectations:Seeking a PrincipledApplication,13 PEPP.L.REv. 267 (198586); David L. Leitner, Enforcing the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations" in Interpreting
InsuranceContracts:A Doctrinein Search of CoherentDefinition,38 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS.
Q. 379 (1988); Diane M. Lucas, Comment, Decapitationto Cure Dandruff? The Scope of the
ReasonableExpectationsDoctrineofDarner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co., 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 841 (1988).
Then-Professor and Vice Dean Keeton added his voice to the commentary, sounding a note of
caution and restraint regarding characterization of his writings and application of the expectations
approach. See Robert E. Keeton, ReasonableExpectationsin the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275
(1976). Keeton described the emergence of the reasonable expectations concept, and noted that
during the 1960s and 1970s, the "principle" was more influential than the "doctrine." See id. at 27677. He also noted the degree to which reasonable expectations analysis may often be interwoven
with ambiguity analysis and detrimental reliance. See id. at 278-79. He was careful to emphasize,
however, that a reasonable expectations approach must do more than merely consider
policyholders' expectations while construing ambiguous language. See id. at 279. Regarding the
degree to which the reasonable expectations approach should impact coverage decisions, Keeton
suggested restraint in both objective and outcome:
Both the fears and the claims generated by this new doctrine may easily be
exaggerated. I do not mean to suggest that the changes are inconsequential. On the
contrary, they may well be the early manifestations of very substantial changes
indeed. The point is that they are not unprincipled changes, and they need not be,
as some have feared, unbridled changes. Several precedents among the small body
of cases already decided make the point that this new doctrine is no guarantee of
victory for a plaintiff against the insurer, and may even be used affirmatively by
an insurer in defense against claims that are beyond reasonable expectations.
Surely, however, there will be instances of misapplication, as there are for any
other doctrine that is entrusted to human beings for application.
Id. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., J.H. Baker, FromSanctity of ContracttoReasonableExpectation?,in CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 1979, at 17, 22-24 (Lord Lloyd et al. eds., 1979); Stephen J. Ware, Comment,
A Critique of the Reasonable ExpectationsDoctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1493 (1989).
Now, if reasonable people in general want the law to protect reasonable
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doctrine's life to date can be described as one of early growth 5followed by
subsequent retreat and dilution, with continuing controversy.
However, despite the prominence of the reasonable expectations debate

in insurance law and the large volume of insurance litigation, Florida
courts avoided taking a definitive position on the role of reasonable

expectations in construing insurance policies until 1998. Unfortunately,
Florida's resolution of the matter was not worth the wait. In Deni
Associates, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & CasualtyInsurance Co.,6 the court
faced two cases that presented a powerful argument for embracing

reasonable expectations analysis.7 The Supreme Court of Florida not only

spumed the opportunity, but rejected the concept curtly in the course of
rendering two problematic holdings.' Worse than the actual holdings of

noncoverage for non-extraordinary tort claims against commercial
policyholders was the contract doctrine adopted by the court almost

without dissent. In an opinion notable for its formal, superficial analysis
and tone, the supreme court exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of
the reasonable expectations concept and appeared mired in an orthodox
form of textual literalism well outside the mainstream of American
contract law.9
Specifically, the court gave a broadly literal reading to the so-called
"absolute" pollution exclusion incorporated into standard commercial
general liability (CGL) insurance policies since the mid-1980s. 0 The
expectations rather than the precise meaning of the formal words they have
adopted, why should the law deny it to them?
The most obvious answer to that question is that the law does not seek to
cushion men against the ordinary buffets of life. Men are always having their
expectations disappointed.... Reasonableness may be a measure of conduct, but
it is not a source of obligation.
Baker, supra, at 23-24.
5. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
ExpectationsApproach and the MisleadingMythology of JudicialRole, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.
(forthcoming 1998); see also Henderson, supra note 3; Rahdert, supra note 3.
6. 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
7. The court reviewed two unrelated cases that had been consolidated by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, both of which involved the same issue. See id. at 1136.
8. See id. at 1140.
9. See id. at 1138-40.
10. A commercial general liability policy (CGL) is the standard liability insurance policy sold
to businesses to protect them from accidents, and liability due to the negligence of the business or
its agents. The CGL obligates an insurer to defend claims against the policyholder or other insureds
under the policy. See generally DONALD S. MALEcKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, COMMERCIAL
GENERAL LIABmrrY (5th ed. 1994); STEMPEL, supra note 1, § TI.2.
The scope of the CGL is broad but also provides a number of exclusions, including the
pollution exclusion. As its name implies, the exclusion is designed to bar coverage for pollution
claims against the policyholder. The exclusion is broadly worded, stating that it excludes from
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insurance industry introduced the absolute pollution exclusion into the
CGL as a reaction to what insurers viewed as excessive coverage
obligations incurred under the former "qualified" pollution exclusion. The
former pollution exclusion generally barred coverage or a defense for
pollution-related liability claims against the policyholder unless the
discharge of pollutant was "sudden and accidental."11 Roughly half the
courts that construed the former exclusion found coverage where the
pollution was unintended but not abrupt. Insurers contended that this result
was not the intent of the former exclusion.12 Since introduction of the
absolute exclusion, courts have generally found that the exclusion bars
coverage for even unintended, abrupt pollution. However, courts have
differed to some degree as to what constitutes "pollution" as opposed to a
non-pollution tort incidentally involving an irritant.' 3 Thus,
notwithstanding the breadth of the absolute exclusion, substantial
insurance coverage litigation during the late 1980s and 1990s has
addressed its scope and application. Against this backdrop, the
construction of the exclusion by a large state such as Florida assumes
considerable importance, as does Florida's attitude toward reasonable
expectations analysis.
Consequently, the Deni Associates opinion is not only a wrongly
decided, poorly reasoned setback for Florida citizens and policyholders-it
is a substantial setback for general insurance coverage doctrine. The
decision also exemplifies the degree to which an unrealistic vision of
contracts generally, and insurance policies in particular, not only continues
to hold sway but also appears reascendent.14 Nonetheless, reasonable

coverage any claim "arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of pollutants." "Pollutant" is defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalines, chemicals and waste." Deni
Assocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137 (quoting portions of the standard pollution exclusion contained in the
policies at issue; Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Form No. CG 00 0111
88 (1988)). See generally STEMPE, supra, § T1.2.
11. See, e.g., Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 871 F. Supp. 941, 944
(E.D. Mich. 1994); STEMPEL, supra note 1, § TI.2.
12. See BARRYR. OSTRAGER&THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOKOFINSURANCECOVERAGE
DISPUTES § 10.02 (9th ed. 1997).
13. See id. § 10.02[e]-[f]; STEMPEL, supra note 1, § T1.2.
14. The decision is surprising and disappointing in view of the normally well-reasoned
opinions from the Supreme Court of Florida, which is composed of intelligent jurists who are
normally sensitive to both legal doctrine and the larger social context of their decisions. All seven
justices on the current supreme court were distinguished practitioners and were also all prominent
lower courtjudges prior to their appointments to the high court, and several have served as adjunct
faculty at Florida State University College of Law and elsewhere. On a personal level, this Article
is difficult to write because my assessment of the DeniAssociatesopinion is so necessarily critical
of the work of a court that I very much respect. At the same time, my criticism of DeniAssociates
is especially hard to contain because the opinion emanates from a court that clearly was capable of
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expectations analysis is available to improve contract interpretation-if
only courts will use it.
This Article thus seeks not just to underscore the errors of the Deni
Associates opinion but also to illustrate the degree to which courts such as
the Supreme Court of Florida have mistakenly spumed the opportunity for
wiser contract construction through use of reasonable expectations
analysis. This judicial error stems from a mistaken view of the reasonable
expectations concept and its doctrinal legitimacy as well as an unrealistic
view of the infallibility of textual analysis. Part I of this Article briefly
reviews the nature and history of the reasonable expectations concept. Part
II describes the two cases considered in DeniAssociates and the pollution
exclusion coverage litigation. Part I critically analyzes the supreme
court's DeniAssociatesopinion, concluding that the court erred both in its
holdings and its failure to realize or acknowledge the difficulty presented
by the two cases. More important, the court erred by embracing a narrow,
hyperliteral, outmoded, and inappropriate form of contract analysis for
insurance policies. Part IV explores the ability of the remaining "absurd
result" yardstick to prevent erroneous contract construction and to focus on
contract purpose and the parties' intent.
I. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS CONCEPT

Judge Keeton enunciated the reasonable expectations principle in his
now-famous article.' 5 The principle states that courts should construe
insurance policies consistently with the objectively reasonable expectations
of the policyholder-even where those expectations are contradicted by
apparently clear policy language.' 6 This formulation of the reasonable
expectations principle has been viewed by much of the legal and political
mainstream as inconsistent with the prevailing American paradigm of
judicial restraint, strict construction of disputed texts, and minimal
government involvement in market activity. 7 Some of this resistance is
likely the product of an unrealistic reification of the prevailing American
politico-legal philosophy of judicial restraint. Some of the resistance
probably results from legitimate concerns aboutjudicial lawmaking that is
less tethered to the text of legal documents. Although excessively reified
and deified, the judicial restraint paradigm remains a bedrock of American
jurisprudence and is unlikely to shift significantly unless American society
incurs radical change. To the extent the reasonable expectations approach

a far better analysis of this important issue.
15. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 967.
16. See id.

17. See sources cited, supra note 3, critical of reasonable expectations doctrine, especially
Rahdert, supra note 3, at 368-73 (summarizing criticisms of reasonable expecations doctrine).
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is viewed as conflicting with the judicial restraint paradigm, it is unlikely
to succeed. However, properly understood, the expectations concept is, in
fact, perfectly consistent with judicial restraint, strict enforcement of
contracts, and predictability in law. i"
The reasonable expectations doctrine, even in its strong "rights at
variance" form, is actually consistent with the prevailing jurisprudential
ethos because of the insurance coverage context. Determining the "correct"
meaning of an insurance policy inevitably requires consideration not only
of policy text, but also the reasonable expectations of both insurerand
insured,even where those expectations to some extent run counter to the
text and certainly where the text is unclear, insufficiently certain, or
applied to unanticipated situations. Contrary to the perspective adopted by
the Supreme Court of Florida, judicial invocation of the reasonable
expectations concept poses no genuine obstacle to vindicating contract law
and ensuring agreement.
Of course, the reasonable expectations concept can be used to construe
ambiguous policy text or to overcome clear text violative of the insured's
reasonable expectations; it can also be used to serve as a check on absurd,
hyperliteral interpretations of policy text. The reasonable expectations
approach can assist courts in determining whether policy provisions are
ambiguous or whether "painstaking" study of the policy suggests a clear
meaning for problematic text. All of these varieties of the reasonable
expectations approach merit more frequent, more expansive, and more
self-consciously reflective use by courts.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19

The reasonable expectations "doctrine" was not, of course, identified
as a separate mode of insurance policy construction until Professor (now
Judge) Robert Keeton's famous article, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions.20 He subsequently came to describe the
consideration of expectations as moving from an identifiable "principle"
18. See Stempel, supra note 5, at(text and notes 258-282 of manuscript).
19. Substantial portions of the following discussion of the history and evolution of the
reasonable expectations doctrine are derived from Stempel, supra note 5, at _.
20. Keeton, supra note 2, at 961. In this first article, Keeton addressed the degree to which
three factors-objectively reasonable policyholder expectations, detrimental reliance, and
unconscionability-combined to give policyholders rights beyond the text of the insurance policy.
See id. at 965-70. In Part II of his project, Keeton discussed the legal evolution away from rigorous
judicial enforcement of warranty provisions in insurance policies, which also tended to give the
policyholder rights "at variance" with the policy language in that warranty provisions had
historically been strictly construed in favor of the insurer rather than the policyholder. See Robert
E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variancewith Policy Provisions:PartTwo, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1970). The second article also discussed insurer reservation of rights and regulatory controls
on policy language and insurer practices. See id. at 1314-17.
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during the 1960s to a "doctrine" in the 1970s.2 Keeton's article was
empirical as well as normative in that it examined judicial decisions and
attempted to find a uniform explanation for cases that seemed to stretch or
torture the notion of linguistic ambiguity.22 Keeton summarized his
assessment in the now-famous words: "The objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms
of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."2

21. Writing six years later, Judge Keeton noted the influence of the reasonable expectations
principle during the 1960s but that "[b]efore a decade had passed, a new doctrine of reasonable
expectations was solidly established" in one state and nearly rooted in two other states. Keeton,
supra note 3, at 275. Keeton further elaborated on the distinction between doctrine and principle:
In the early years of the 1970s judicial support for a doctrine of reasonable
expectations gradually increased....
As an aid to understanding this development in insurance law, it may be useful
to observe a distinction between what we might call a "principle" and a "doctrine"
of honoring reasonable expectations. What has happened in the 1960s and 1970s
is explicit judicial endorsement 'of a new ground of decision-a development
connoted by the term "doctrine." The influence of the principle was apparent even
earlier, and its influence during the 1960s and 1970s was considerably more
pervasive than the applications of the doctrine.
Because we depend on language to express substantive distinctions, we are
always in danger of mistaking semantics for deeper substance. Nevertheless, the
distinction between a "principle" and a "doctrine" of reasonable expectations is
one of deeper substance, however imprecisely it may be expressed by our
linguistic usages.
Principles collide in a sense beyond doctrinal conflict. Doctrines are sets of
explicit rules of decision-the outcomes of accommodation among competing
principles. Conflicts among doctrines are imperfections yet to be worked out as
the operational rules of the legal system evolve. The collision of principles, on the
other hand, is a phenomenon that does not signal imperfection of the legal system
but rather signals the underlying conflict of interests with which the legal system
must grapple.
Id. at 276-77.
22. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 965-70.
23. Id. at 967. In addition, the Keeton article posited additional principles creating
policyholder rights beyond the terms of insurance policy text. According to Keeton, "[i]f the
enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reasonable expectations of the great majority
of policyholders to whose claims it is relevant, it will not be enforced even against those who know
of its restrictive terms." Id. at 974. "An insurer will not be permitted an unconscionable advantage
in an insurance transaction even though the policyholder or other person whose interests are
affected has manifested fully informed consent." Id. at 963. "A policyholder or other person
intended to receive benefits under an insurance policy is entitled to redress against the insurer to
the extent of detriment he suffers because he or another person justifiably relied upon an agent's
representation incidental to his employment for the insurer." Id. at 977-78.
Thus, although the Keeton article is best known for its identification and formulation of the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/2

8

Stempel: Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Constru
LIABILITYINSURANCEPOLLUTIONEXCLUSION

Keeton observed that courts occasionally utilized expectations analysis
to go beyond the normal benefit accorded the policyholder when policy
language was unclear.24 In such a case, any ambiguities in the policy were
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.' When a court
applies "pure" reasonable expectations theory, it mandates coverage
consistent with the policyholder's expectations even if relatively clear
policy language is to the contrary.26
In the wake of the Keeton article, courts and commentators identified
expectations analysis as more than ordinary equitable interpretation in
which the parties' expectations are considered in construing ambiguous
contract language and preventing absurd results from the literal
interpretation of a contract term. Commentary after the Keeton article
focused on the rights-at-variance "brand" of reasonable expectations set
forth by Keeton, and debated the extent to which policyholder expectations
should be permitted to trump "clear" contract provisions.27 Although the
presence of a role for a "milder" version of expectations analysis is
frequently acknowledged by commentators,28 it is not the primary subject
of scholarly explorations of the role of reasonable expectations.
Keeton's article specifically identified two other significant
circumstances where the policyholder should have additional rights even
where the text of the policy augered against coverage. The first such
situation was where the strictly applied policy language would create an
unconscionable advantage for the insurer. The second situation was where
the insured had relied to its detriment on the representations or conduct of
the insurer.29
After Judge Keeton's article, several courts accepted Keeton's analysis
and overtly declared themselves followers of the reasonable expectations
approach. 0 But, "the expectations principle [was and] is being employed
reasonable expectations principle, Keeton also identified the reasonable expectations approach as
preventing even defenses of actual knowledge and noted the importance of unconscionability and
detrimental reliance as grounds for recovery under an adversely worded policy.
24. See id. at 965-75.
25. See id. at 965-66.
26. The rationale for the approach is based on several factors: the complexity of policy
language; standardization of policies; the adhesion nature of most insurance policies; the
contracting process, in which insureds almost never see the full policy until after it is in force and
seldom read it; and the need to protect unsophisticated or vulnerable insureds. See STEMPEL, supra
note 1, § 11.3; Abraham, supra note 3, at 1153-55; Keeton, supra note 2, at 963-85; Rahdert, supra
note 3, at 326-29; Ware, Comment, supra note 4, at 1463-64.
27. See sources cited in supra note 3.
28. See sources cited in supra note 3.
29. See supranote 23.
30. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 312; Abraham, supra note 3, at 1153 n.7 (finding
more than 100 "opinions voicing the expectations principle" that were "decided both before and
after Professor Keeton's article"); Rahdert, supranote 3, at 324,354-67; Karen K. Shinevar, Note,
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in varying situations and with varying justifications..' Many courts had
difficulty embracing a concept they regarded as turning too quickly away
from the traditional contract law principle positing that contract language
should be enforced as written if it is sufficiently clear. These courts were
willing to consider policyholder expectations only if policy language was
ambiguous. 32 Other courts were willing to utilize the Keeton form of
reasonable expectations analysis to overcome clear text, but only where
language favorable to insurers was complex, hidden, unfairly surprising,
or where the insured was a consumer or small business. 3
The Keeton thesis rapidly caught the attention of the academic
community and a good deal of the judiciary and practicing bar as well.
Although assessments vary, observers consider at least a dozen states to
have adopted the doctrine in the form articulated by Judge Keeton,35 while
more than half the states have invoked the reasonable expectations concept

A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to Insurance
Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 603, 611-14 (1980) (collecting cases discussing reasonable
expectations).
Again, for historical fairness, I should note that Keeton suggested that the doctrine was "solidly
established" in New Jersey prior to publication of his article. Keeton, supra note 3, at 275 (citing
six New Jersey cases). However, even if one reads these cases as solidly supporting the reasonable
expectations orientation, as does Keeton, the caselaw here and elsewhere did not use reasonable
expectations terminology until after appearance of the Keeton article.
31. Abraham, supra note 3, at 1153; see Henderson, supra note 3, at 824 (noting the
uncertainty and unpredictability in the application of the reasonable expectations principle);
Stempel, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 313 (stating that "[d]etermining the exact status of the reasonable
expectations school is difficult. In many states, court discussion is intermeshed with other insurance
contract terminology. In other states, only lower courts have invoked the term, sometimes with
different assessments or at least different actual use of the concept.").
32. See, e.g., Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903,908 (Iowa 1973)
(examining the expectations of policyholders only when a layperson would not understand the
exclusion at issue, or where insurer conduct created an expectation of coverage).
But, as noted above, my view is that courts permitting policyholder expectations to assist in
interpretation only where contract language is ambiguous have failed to provide thorough analysis
of the reach and application of the expectations principle. Most such decisions merely note that
ambiguous terms must be construed consistently with the reasonable expectations of the parties and
then render a decision without further discussion of the parties' expectations and their basis.
33. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271,277-78
& n.2 (Minn. 1985). However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota later refused to apply the
reasonable expectations analysis of Atwater Creamery to a pollution exclusion provision that it
found was clearly designated in the policy. See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co., 517
N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1994).
34. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, ch. 1; Henderson, supra note 3, at 823-24 nn.5-8
(summarizing commentary and developments in the wake of the Keeton article).
35. See, e.g., Henderson, supranote 3, at 823 n.5 ("As many as sixteen states may be viewed
as having adopted the doctrine, but it is not clear whether every court intended to embrace the
broadest formulation.").
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with favor.36 However, the form of reasonable expectations applied is one

in which "application of the reasonable expectations doctrine is typically
limited to cases in which the policy is ambiguous and the mutual intent of
the parties cannot be determined. 37
After its rapid initial success, however, the Keeton doctrine was subject
to limitation, retrenchment, and even reversal in many states.38 Today, by
the most liberal count of two leading commentators, thirty-eight states
"have recognized some variation of the reasonable expectations
doctrine. '39 States may be divided into three categories. First, some states
have adopted reasonable expectations analysis supporting rights at variance
with policy text as set forth by Keeton.' Second, some states utilize the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder only in interpreting ambiguous
policy language.4 And, third, some states have completely rejected the
doctrine.42 As noted above, some commentators make a more blunt cut,
classifying states as either accepting or rejecting the approach.43 A review

36. See Ostrager & Newman, supra note 12, § 1.03[b].
37. See id. § 1.03[b], at 21 (citing cases).
38. See STEMPEL, supranote 1; Rahdert, supranote 3, at323 (describing state court decisions
reversing or limiting earlier application of reasonable expectations doctrine).
39. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 12, § 1.03[b], at 22.
40. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Iowa
1975) (insurance policy covers theft with no visible marks despite policy language requiring visible
marks; reasonable expectations of policyholder overcome exclusionary language); Kievit v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 30 (N.J. 1961) (requiring coverage to effectuate the
policyholder's reasonable expectations notwithstanding exclusionary language). See also Rahdert,
supra note 3, at 353 n. 111 (listing states that apply the Keeton analysis). The Minnesota case of
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western NationalMutual InsuranceCo., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985)
is frequently viewed as a leading case adopting the pure Keeton-esque version of the doctrine. See,
e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 53 (2d ed. 1995) (reproducing
Atwater Creameryas part of casebook's discussion of reasonable expectations concept). However,
Atwater Creamery is arguably more limited in that subsequent Minnesota decisions have
emphasized that the reasonable expectations can trump clear policy language only where the
language is hidden or unfairly surprising. See supra note 33.
41. See, e.g., Nile Valley Coop. Grain & Milling Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 193
N.W.2d 752,754-55 (Neb. 1972); Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920,926
(Pa. 1987); see also Rahdert, supra note 3, at 366-67 (discussing four states that apply reasonable
expectations analysis only if policy language is ambiguous).
42. See, e.g., Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633,
639 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasonable expectations doctrine "soundly rejected by Ohio Courts"); Allen
v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 789, 803-06 (Utah 1992) (rejecting approach on
jurisprudential grounds of excessively expanding court powers in unguided manner); Casey v.
Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) (denying coverage to policyholder after
property loss from theft because of clarity of exclusion requiring visible marks).
43. See, e.g., OSTRAGER.NEWMAN, supranote 12, § 1.03[b] (dividing states into those that
"recognize the reasonable expectations doctrine" (citing decisions in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
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of the cases, however, suggests somewhat more variety in the manner in
which courts employ the reasonable expectations concept.'
On the whole, the 1970s can be seen as something of a "growth period"
for the reasonable expectations doctrine. The doctrine-unnamed until
Keeton's article-was widely discussed and utilized, with adoption in
seemingly pure form in several states.45 The 1980s continued to see growth
in support of reasonable expectations analysis, but also began to reveal
some backpedaling by courts that had adopted the doctrine, as well as a
weakening tendency in other states to embrace the reasonable expectations
method.46 The cases of the 1990s suggest that the reasonable expectations

Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin)
and those "that have rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine" (citing decisions in Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington).
When the list of states recognizing the doctrine is examined more closely, it appears that fewer
than a dozen states have applied the Keeton doctrine in rights at variance form. Certainly, New
York is not generally regarded as a rights at variance state even though it may have "recognized"
the role of reasonable expectations in construing unclear policy language. See Rahdert, supranote
3, at 346 n.77. Conversely, until the Deni Associates decision, it was not clear that Florida had
definitively rejected the doctrine. See Deni Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.
2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998).
44. See Stempel, supra note 5, at notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
45. In part, this was undoubtedly because courts in some states merely began to name what
they had been doing for some time. As noted above, the Keeton thesis was based on his empirical
observations of what courts did and was not a purely normative or aspirational view. See Keeton,
supra note 3, at 275-76 (explaining that he identified the reasonable expectations doctrine based
on actual court decisions of the 1960s and suggesting that the reasonable expectations approach was
not a substantial departure from ordinary contract construction).
46. Academic reaction to reasonable expectations reveals a similar pattern of embrace
followed by some retreat, although the doctrine continues to enjoy more support among scholars
than among the courts. Throughout both the 1970s and 1980s, the reasonable expectations doctrine
was the subject of considerable commentary. See sources cited supranote 3. Legal scholars tended
to support the rasonable expectations approach, although some expressed misgivings or even
attacked the doctrine. See Ware, Comment, supra note 4, at 1461. See also,e.g., STEMPEL, supra
note 1, § 11.3 (outlining 'Justifications and criticisms" of the doctrine); Rahdert, supra note 3, at
336-45 (listing pro and con arguments regarding expectations approach); Baker, supra note 4, at
23-24; Ware, Comment, supra note 4, at 1461-62:
Now if reasonable people in general want the law to protect reasonable
expectations rather than the precise meaning of the formal words they have
adopted, why should the law deny it to them?
The most obvious answer to that question is that the law does not seek to
cushion men against the ordinary buffets of life. Men are always having their
expectations disappointed ...Reasonableness may be a measure of conduct, but
it is not a source of obligation.
Baker, supra note 4, at 23-24. Insurers and their counsel, have largely been unrelenting in their
opposition. See, e.g., Perlet, supra note 3; Squires, supra note 3, at 255-57.
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"plebiscite" among the states is remaining relatively stable, with few states
changing their respective positions on the doctrine.4 7 Professor Rahdert,
writing in 1986, 4 and Professor Henderson, writing in 1990,49 found a
similar pattern of initial growth, uncertainty, retrenchment, and stability
with a diluted version of the reasonable expectations principle holding
sway in most states. Professor Henderson expressly found,5" and Professor
Rahdert implicitly found, that despite dilution of the Keeton rights-atvariance version of expectations analysis, the concept had a significant
effect on modem insurance constructionjurisprudence. Courts themselves
appear to see the reasonable expectations approach as an established part
of the legal landscape despite reluctance to embrace the concept in rightsat-variance form.51 At the very least, the reasonable expectations approach
appears to be stalled, if not continuing to lose ground. A 1992 Utah
decision rejected the doctrine in perhaps the most comprehensive antireasonable expectations case of the 1990s,52 and the 1998 DeniAssociates

47. A LEXIS search of caselaw from the 1970s reveals 36 cases citing to either the Keeton
Rights at Variance article or discussion of the reasonable expectations principle in Keeton's
insurance law treatise. ROBERTE. KEETON, BASICTExTONINSURANCELAW (1971). Prior to 1970,
there was no express discussion of a reasonable expectations principle and no express suggestion
that clear policy text could be overcome not only by unconscionability or actual estoppel but by
policyholder expectations.
In the 1980s, 73 cases discuss the expectations principle and cite to one of the Keeton sources,
with 61 cases doing so during the period from 1990 to the present. Those numbers increase to 89
and 75, respectively, when citations to the Second Edition of the Keeton treatise, co-authored with
Professor Alan Widiss, are included. Although cases from the 1980s and 1990s show more actual
use of the expectations principle, it remains accurate to view the 1970s as the period of doctrinal
growth during which the reasonable expectations principle grew from an undefined concept to a
recognized "doctrine" that was embraced by a significant number of courts.
48. See Rahdert, supra note 3, at 353-67 (analyzing the development of the reasonable
expectations doctrine in Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).
49. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 827-34 (containing a survey of the states that have
accepted the reasonable expectations doctrine).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 912 P.2d 861,86870 (Okla. 1996). The Max True court concluded that the reasonable expectations doctrine had been
accepted in some form in 36 states, see id. at 863-64 n.5, but cited cases from four states expressly
rejecting the doctrine, see id. at 864 n.6. Ultimately, the Max True court, like most courts, was
willing to consider expectations analysis only after having concluded that the policy language at
issue was ambiguous. See id. at 868.
52. See Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). InAllen, the
policyholder held a homeowner's policy. See id. at 799. When the Aliens' two-year-old son was
injured by a pot of boiling water spilled by Mrs. Allen, the Allens sought coverage for the son's
liability claim against the parents. See id. at 799-800. Prudential refused payment, citing the
"household exclusion," a common provision in homeowner's policies that bars coverage for claims
made against the policyholder by other members of the household. See id. at 800. Because the
household exclusion is so common, serves a readily understandable purpose, and is rather clearly
worded, the Utah court could simply have decreed that the exclusion's enforcement did not violate

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
476

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

decision was equally resistant to expectations analysis.53
In the 1990s, industry attack on expectations analysis and policyholder
defense of the expectations approach continues, but the rush of attention
given to the doctrine during the 1970s and 1980s seems to have abated.
Legal scholars have not focused on the doctrine as frequently or explicitly
during the 1990s; however, the issue continues to receive major scholarly
treatment, although often as a subset of an examination of insurance
coverage doctrine in general rather than the reasonable expectations
principle alone.54 Against this backdrop, Florida finally came face-to-face
with reasonable expectations analysis.
I[. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS FLOUNDERING IN FLORIDA:
THE DENIASSOCIATES CASE55
A. Avoiding a Definitive Stand: Florida'sQuarter-Centuryof
Resistance to Addressing Reasonable ExpectationsAnalysis
Perhaps surprisingly, nearly three decades after the Keeton article,
several of the largest states still lack an extended evaluation principle by
the highest court of the state. For example, New York is cited as a state
both embracing and rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine.56 In the
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder. However, the court launched into an extensive
discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, reviewing its genesis and development,
criticizing its intellectual foundations, and refusing to incorporate it into Utah law. See id. at 80104.
53. See Deni Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Fla.
1998).
54. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?:Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995,1002 (1992); HENDERSON,supra note
3, at 823; Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialInterpretationsof Insurance ContractDisputes: Toward

a Realistic Middle GroundApproach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543,551-54 (1996) [hereinafter Swisher,
JudicialInterpretations];Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialRationalesin InsuranceLaw: Dusting Off

the Formalforthe Function,52 OHIO ST.L.J. 1037,1051-56 (1990) [hereinafter Swisher, Judicial
Rationales];Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The ReasonableExpectations Doctrine:An Alternative to
Bending and Stretching TraditionalTools of ContractInterpretation,18 WM. MrrcHEL.LL. REV.

1113 (1992).
55. Substantial portions of the following discussion of the intermediated appellate court
opinion in DeniAssociates are drawn from Stempel, supra note 5, at
56. In my view, New York is receptive to reasonable expectations thinking in the
interpretation of insurance policies (and other contracts for that matter) but will not utilize
reasonable expectations analysis to find coverage in the face of sufficiently clear contract language.
But despite the passing of three decades since Keeton wrote, the New York Court of Appeals has
not expressly discussed the reasonable expectations doctrine to officially accept or reject the Keeton
approach.
In determining the proper meaning of a disputed insurance contract term, the court favors a
construction that comports with the reasonable expectations ofthe policyholder. See Album Realty
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Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 607 N.E.2d 804,805 (N.Y. 1992); Ace Wire &Cable Co.
v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 457 N.E.2d 761,764 (N.Y. 1983); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1974).
The case of Little v. Blue Cross, 424 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), summarizes New
York law well on this point:

[The terms of a contract as a whole shall be examined in determining the intent
of the parties, and... where the meaning of a policy of insurance is in doubt or
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, all ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the policy holder and against the company which issued the
policy ...the reasonable expectation of an insured from his reading of the policy
must control.
Id. at 555-56 (citations omitted); see also NEwYORKJURISPRUDENCE 2D Insurance§ 706, at 10001 (1988) ("Ihe meaning of coverage and exclusion provisions of a liability insurance policy is to
be resolved in the light of the reasonable expectation and purpose of an ordinary businessman in
making the contract of insurance. If an insurance company desires to limit its liability in a drastic
manner it must express the limitation in language that will reasonably convey its meaning to an
intelligent layman or a person of ordinary business intelligence.").
However, in ordinary contract cases, the New York Court of Appeals will generally not look
past the intent of the parties as expressed in their written agreement. See W.W.W. Assocs. Inc. v.
Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that intent of the parties is the touchstone
for determining the meaning of a contract term); Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448
N.E.2d 413,416 (N.Y. 1983) (indicating a clear exculpatory clause will not apply to protect a party
from willful or grossly negligent acts); Breed v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 128283 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that the best determinant of the parties' intent is ordinarily the contract
language, which will be given its plain and ordinary meaning as long as this does not lead to an
absurd result or to a result clearly at odds with party intent or the purpose of the instrument even
clear contract language will not be enforced if contract term is unconscionable or violates public
policy of state).
Courts applying New York law have on occasion endorsed the reasonable expectations doctrine
in essentially "pure" form where policyholder expectations can overcome even clear and reasonable
policy language negating coverage. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. CNA Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1495,
1503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1988); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 400 F. Supp. 978,980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 546 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976); Atlantic
Cement Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 459 N.Y.S.2d 425, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 471
N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1984); Riordan v. Auto Club of New York, Inc., 422 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814-15
(N.Y. App. Term. 1979); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 12, § 103[b]. But see
Moshiko, Inc. v. Seiger & Smith, Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287-88 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 522
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1988) (stating that plain contract language controls and evidence of party expectation
not effective to provide for different result).
A number of New York cases, despite refraining from any express analysis of the "reasonable
expectations doctrine," suggest that the concept affects judicial thinking on insurance coverage and
may benefit either policyholders or insurers. In Michaelsv. City ofBuffalo, 651 N.E.2d 1272,1273
(N.Y. 1995), the third-party claimant was the estate of a decedent who had arguably died because
of a delay in transporting him to a hospital when the first ambulance dispatched failed to start. The
ambulance company sought coverage under its "business auto policy" that provided coverage for
liability resulting from an "accident." Id. at 1273. The court held that the failure of the first
ambulance to start was not an "accident" within the meaning of the policy even if it resulted from
the ambulance company's failure to maintain the vehicle. See id. at 1274. The court found, in effect,
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years since the Keeton article, Florida has, until recently, said little about
reasonable expectations, artfully dodging an extended discussion of the
concept for a quarter-century. But as one might expect, a large and
important jurisdiction such as Florida faced an almost hydraulic pressure
to at last address the issue at length. In State Farm Fire & Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Deni Associates, Inc.,"7 an intermediate appellate court
certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: "Where
an ambiguity is shown to exist in a CGL policy, is the court limited to
resolving the ambiguity in favor of coverage, or may the court apply the
doctrineof reasonable
expectations of the insuredto resolve ambiguities
58
in CGL policies?
Although Florida law on reasonable expectations prior to Deni
Associates was remarkably nondefinitive, it is clear that Florida had never
accepted the pure Keeton form of the doctrine. Some decisions implicitly
criticized the expectations concept. 9 Similarly, Florida never adopted a
reasonable expectations doctrine for hidden, surprising, or unfair policy
language. However, in cases involving hidden or nonobvious restrictions
on coverage, Florida courts frequently found oppressive language to be
ambiguous, or vitiated by other representations.' In general, Florida

no reasonable policyholder expectation of coverage, notwithstanding the debatability of the
meaning of the term "accident." See id. In Moshiko, Inc. v. Seiger & Smith, 529 N.Y.S.2d 284, 28889 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), the court refused to find an insurer obligated to provide first-party water
damage benefits for flooding that damaged the policyholder's own goods. The policy was a thirdparty liability policy, although it did not spell this out in the text of the policy. See id. at 287. The
court found that the insured could not have reasonably expected first-party property coverage. See
id.
57. 678 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (en banc).
58. Id. at 404.
59. See, e.g., Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938,942
(Fla. 1979) (courts may not "rewrite contracts" to "add meaning"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986) (rejecting coverage where auto lost through
conversion; "mere fact that a provision in an insurance policy could be more clearly drafted" does
not create ambiguity); AAA Life Ins. Co. v. Nicolas, 603 So. 2d 622,627 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) ("a
court shall not rewrite a contract of insurance extending coverage afforded beyond that plainly set
forth in the insurance contract"); Dorrell v. State Farm Cas. Co., 221 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
(courts must follow definition of terms set forth in policy).
60. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Birge, 659 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
(holding, over strong dissent, that absolute pollution exclusion does not bar coverage for damages
caused by sewer backup notwithstanding obvious contaminant quality of loss).
We agree with the trial judge that the policy was ambiguous. The average
homeowner's examination of the insurance contract would not reveal the
applicability of these exclusions to this type of disaster. Our conclusion is
supported by the availability of clear and unambiguous language that the insurance
company could have used to exclude damage resulting from a backup of raw
sewage.
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insurance coverage cases generally followed the traditional approach to
policy interpretation and accepted the following common precepts. The
meaning of a contract is a question of law.61 The policy is to be read as a
whole rather than focusing on words in isolation, with effect given to all
provisions if possible. 62 Terms and phrases in an insurance policy are
generally given their natural, practical, and reasonable meaning.63 Where
a policy term or provision is textually clear, it will be enforced as written.6'
When Florida courts find that policy language is clear, parol evidence and
extrinsic evidence are generally not admissible to vary or modify the
textual terms. 65 Such evidence is available, however, in order to explain an
unclear provision.'
Florida law remains unclear regarding whether the background and
context of the insurance transaction is considered parol or extrinsic
evidence that cannot be consulted absent facial ambiguity of the policy
text.67 Where policy language is unclear and resort to extrinsic matter does
not resolve the ambiguity, the dispute is resolved against the party that

Id. at 311; see also Weldon v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
("Since an insurer, as draftsman of the form policy, will not be allowed to use obscure terms to
defeat the purpose for which a policy is purchased, the terms must be liberally construed in favor
of coverage so that where two interpretations are available the one allowing greater indemnity will
prevail."); Bunnell Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Barrera, 419 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (finding
seemingly facially clear language to have "latent" ambiguity requiring use of extrinsic information
to construe policy in favor of coverage).
61. See Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1985).
62. See Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938, 941-42
(Fla. 1979).
63. See Weldon, 605 So. 2d at 914-15; American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horn, 353 So. 2d
565,568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
64. See Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Sea World, Inc., 586 So. 2d 95,97 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); United
States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bove, 347 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
65. See Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700,702-03 (Fla.
1993) (refusing to consider drafting history and statements to regulators as relevant to meaning of
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion deemed textually unambiguous by the court). This
decision effectively reversed the earlier decision ofDimmittChevrolet,Inc.v. SoutheasternFidelity
Ins. Corp., 17 Fla. L. Weekly S579, S581-82 (Fla. Sept. 3, 1992), which found the drafting history
and regulatory estoppel relevant to determine the meaning of the phrase "sudden and accidental."
66. See Dimmitt, 636 So. 2d at 705.
67. For example, in Dimmitt Chevrolet,Inc. v. Southeastern FidelityInsuranceCorp., the
Supreme Court of Florida utilized the drafting history of the policy language to conclude that the
former "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion contained in CGL policies prior to 1985 was
ambiguous and provided coverage for gradual but unintentional pollution. See 17 Fla. L. Weekly
S579, S581-82 (Fla. Sept. 3, 1992). However, the court then granted the insurer's motion for
rehearing, and the second decision on the point found no ambiguity, refused to be influenced by
the drafting history, and concluded that the term "sudden" required that claims result from abrupt,
unintentional pollution to be covered under the old CGL policy language. See Dimmitt, 636 So. 2d
at 702-03.
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drafted the ambiguous language, which is usually the insurer.68 Despite the
failure of Florida courts to embrace the reasonable expectations doctrine,
Florida courts have used the reasonable expectations concept in order to
resolve thorny coverage issues and to protect the interests of both the
policyholder 69 and the insurer.70
B. The Deni Associates and Fogg Cases
1. Lower Court Proceedings
a. The Factual Background
Deni Associates, an architectural and engineering firm, was moving
office equipment into new quarters when workers jostled or knocked over
a blueprint machine, spilling ammonia contained inside.7" (Ammonia is
used as part of the process of making blueprints.) The ammonia spill was
serious enough to force evacuation of the building for six hours, breaking
of a window for ventilation, and removal of affected carpeting."
(Obviously, it was not one of Deni's more productive days.) In addition,
other building tenants were evacuated, leading to claims against Deni.73 In
the companion case to Deni Associates, E.C. Fogg, III v. FloridaFarm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the citrus farm partnership retained a
contractor to spray Ethion insecticide on a citrus grove.74 Using a
helicopter, the sprayer went slightly wide of the mark, spraying two men
68. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986);
Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938, 942 (Fla. 1979).
69. See, e.g., Spengler v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 568 So. 2d 1293, 1294-95 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990) (finding the intentional act exclusion in homeowner's policy inapplicable to claim by
policyholder's girlfriend, who policyholder accidentally shot when he mistook her for a burglar);
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruess, 394 So. 2d 468,470 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (finding that rental
pilot exclusion inapplicable to coverage claim arising from aircraft liability policy; court based
opinion on "more reasonable interpretation of [the] policy").
70. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Hurtado, 587 So. 2d 1314, 1318-19 (Fla.
1991) (refusing to "stack" uninsured motorist coverage for each car in a fleet of vehicles in order
to reach large amount of coverage not set forth in policy limits); PomonaPark,369 So. 2d at 942
(construing general liability policy sold to liquor store as not providing dram shop liability coverage
because of liquor liability exclusion, and refusing to find exclusion ambiguous despite notion that
policy sold to liquor store might be expected to cover liquor liability due in part to drastically
higher exposure in dram shop actions).
71. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397,399 (4th DCA
1996), afd, 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. The Fogg case was consolidated with the Deni Associates case by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. See id. at 399.
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on adjacent property, resulting in serious injuries to the bystanders and
substantial personal injury claims against the partnership.75
Both Deni Associates and the Fogg partnership sought defense and
indemnity under their respective Commercial General Liability policies,
which generally cover personal injury claims, but also contained an
exclusion providing:
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or directly and
immediately caused by one or more of the following.
E. The presence, release, discharge or dispersal of pollutants,
meaning any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste, except as provided in the Pollutant
Clean Up and Removal Extension of Coverage.76
The trial courts in both Deni Associates and Fogg ruled that this
"absolute" pollution exclusion was ambiguous as applied to the instant
facts and granted summary judgment for the policyholders."7 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed. 78 Because of the relative youth of the
absolute pollution exclusion (inserted into CGL policies only since the
mid-1980s), DeniAssociatesandFogg would have been noteworthy cases
in any event, particularly in a large and important jurisdiction such as
Florida. But Deni Associates and Fogg take on considerably more
significance because the appellate court addressed the reasonable
expectations doctrine in some detail, engaged in extensive discussion about
the theory and practice of insurance coverage, and then placed the issue
before the Supreme Court of Florida.
b. Competing Theories of Policy Construction and Expectation
The trial court in Deni Associates not only employed traditional
ambiguity analysis but expressly hinged its decision upon "what a
reasonable person placed in the position of the insured would have
' In reversing, the majority of
understood the word [pollution] to mean."79
a sharply divided en banc Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed, and
after an extensive discussion found the pollution exclusion unambiguous

75. See id. at 399.
76. Id. at 406 (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State Farm policy
issued to Deni Associates).
77. See id. at 399.
78. See id. at 403-04.
79. Id. at 399.
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and clearly applicable to the two coverage disputes.80 The majority
concluded that the insured's reasonable expectations had no force where
insurance policy language was clear.8" According to the court, the ammonia
in the blueprint machine and the Ethion insecticide sprayed from the air
were clearly "pollutants" and the discharge or release of these pollutants
had caused the underlying liability claims.8 2
In particular, the appellate court majority found reasonable expectations
analysis to have no place in insurance coverage matters because it ran afoul
of the objective theory of contract.8" To some extent, the Deni Associates
court revived focus on a part of contract doctrine frequently
overlooked-the notion that contract language must be given an objective
and universally applicable meaning in order to prevent opportunistic postdispute behavior by the parties. Quoting an older Florida case and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the majority observed:
The [objective theory of contract] is probably best expressed
by the late Justice Holmes in "The Path of the Law," where it
was stated in part that "The making of a contractdepends not
on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the
agreement of two sets of external signs-not on the parties
having meant the same thing but on their having said the
same thing. "84
From this, the Deni Associates majority erroneously concluded that
application of the reasonable expectations doctrine would make coverage
turn on the subjective beliefs of the litigant policyholder.8 5 Actually,
Keeton's reasonable expectations formula is quite clear that the
reasonableness of a coverage expectation is determined by an objective
standard. 86 That is, the reasonableness of an expectation would turn on
what the mythical reasonable person in the policyholder's position would
expect, not upon the idiosyncratic notions of the policyholder involved in
the dispute. Presumably, the Deni Associates majority slid into this offkilter view by contrasting the result it thought was dictated by the
"objective" theory of contract and the result that would obtain under a
reasonable expectations approach, thereby leading the Deni Associates
majority to erroneously conclude that anything supporting a result at odds

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 402-03.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 402.
Id. at 400 (quoting Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957)) (citation

omitted).
85. See id. at 402.
86. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 967.
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with the court's view of the objectively literal meaning of the exclusion
must rest on subjective grounds.
The Holmes view of an "objective theory of contract" has tended to
fade into the background in American law even though it was never really
rejected. 7 Holmes himself seemed considerably less confident about such
an objectively undebatable meaning of language. Twenty years after his
law review article quoted with such assurance by the Deni Associates
majority, Justice Holmes penned the at least equally famous words: "A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used. 88
The rarified version of the objective theory of contract has faded in
large part because it presumes an unrealistic level of certainty as to the
meaning of words. According to this mythology, agreement is widespread
and easily reached regarding whether disputing parties "said the same
thing." In contrast to the view of the early Holmes, Yale Law Professor
Arthur Corbin wrote that "no word or phrase has one true and unalterable
meaning."89 As more recently put by a prominent contracts scholar writing
in the Corbin tradition, "[t]he very concept of plain meaning finds scant
support in semantics, where one of the cardinal teachings is the fallibility
of language as a means of communication."' Furthermore, contract
construction inherently involves more than simply extracting a linguistic
87. See GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS INA NUTSHELL (3d ed.
1990) (describing modem approach under the American Law Institutes RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS (1981) as having replaced the "objective" theory of contract with emphasis on
subjective intent of the parties).
88. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918); see also NEILDUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 34-46, 60 (1995) (stating that Holmes exhibited elements of both
formalism and anti-formalism, or realism in his thinking, and even while writing The Common Law
he espoused a mixture of views despite generally favoring objective standards and positive law);
Symposium, The Pathof the Law 100 years Later: Holmes' Influence on Modem Jurisprudence,
63 BROOK. L. REV. 1-278 (containing works by several Holmes scholars who note the eclectic
nature of Holmes' views and the evolution of his thinking over time, with observers often
disagreeing about his thoughts and role); Richard A. Posner, Foreword:Holmes, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 7,9-11 (1996) (Holmes was "buzzing hive" of ideas and his writings are not always consistent
even though Holmes' basic philosophy did not change greatly during his career; "the Holmes of the
opinions is more formalistic and positivistic, especially in contract cases and in matters of
interpretation and stare decisis, than the Holmes of the book and the articles"). In a sense, the
Holmes posited by Posner (based on the work of Professor Thomas Grey) may reflect a general trait
of American contract law, where legal scholarship is less textual and formalist than judicial
decisions in contract disputes. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text (noting that the
judiciary may act with excessive formalism, textualism, and accompanying rhetoric to minimize the
judicial burden in resolving cases and rendering opinions).
89. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535, at 495 (1952).
90. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 952
(1967).
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definition from the contract language (even assuming reasonable readers
were not in some disagreement over the semantic meaning of the words):
[A]s part of the process of interpreting whether a contract was
formed and, if so, the scope of contractual obligation, legal
decision-makers mold obligations along socially desired lines.
Interpretation cannot be neutral, but must be done from some
point of view.... [T]he law must supply a great deal of the
content of contractual obligations. No matter how detailed
parties are in their planning, they will never plan for every
contingency (Nor is it necessarily desirable that the law
encourage them to try to do so). Supplied terms reflect social
views of the proper goals of contractual relations.9 '
Many, if not most, contemporary courts-in contrast to the Florida
appellate court in Deni Associates-appearmore inclined to the Corbin
perspective. As one court observed:
In truth, language is inherently ambiguous. Nevertheless, over
the centuries courts have developed a variety of interpretive
tools to use in resolving the ambiguities that necessarily
attach when written laws must be translated into legal
decisions. The reliance of courts and litigants on claimed
"plain meaning" usually represents a conscious disregard of
evidence that would lead to an undesired result, and not the
existence of true unambiguity. To translate the words [at issue
in the case] into terms of meaning requires looking to all
available interpretive tools, ' and
92 not simply relying on the
false idol of "plain meaning.
A noted contracts scholar has made a similar observation:
Indeed, it is questionable whether a word has a meaning at
all when divorced from the circumstances in which it is used.
Dictionary definitions may be of help in showing the general
use of words, but they are not necessarily dispositive....
Often the meaning attached to a word by the parties must be
gleaned from its context, including all the circumstances of
the transaction. 93

91. Jean Braucher, ContractVersus Contractarianism:TheRegulatoryRoleofContractLaw,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697,701 (1990).
92. Apache Nitrogen Prods., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 674, 679 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(citations omitted) (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535 (1960)); see also E.
ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9 (2d ed. 1991).
93. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.10, at 512 (footnotes omitted); see also Farnsworth,
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Although the reasonable expectations principle has been inaccurately
portrayed by its critics as a radical departure from settled contract
doctrine,94 Keeton in essence only refined and clarified modem contract
law. Under this vision of contract law, one that arguably has been
dominant over formalism and literalism for several decades,9' courts
recognize the practical elusiveness of seeking an objectively agreed
meaning of terms based only on words themselves. Writing outside the
field of insurance law, Keeton observed:
Differences in terminology sometimes interfere with
communication. The risk of misunderstanding is especially
high if writer and reader, or speaker and listener, are not alert
to each other's usages. You can use a word or phrase with any
meaning you choose to give it, but you cannot force others to
understand it that way. Moreover, if you propose a meaning
different from ordinary usage, the risk that others will
misunderstand what you mean rises dramatically.96
A term like "pollution" and the pollution exclusion litigation of Deni
Associates provide powerful support for Keeton's point.
The Deni Associates majority in the appellate court applied a strict
version of the traditional rule on extrinsic evidence-permitting
consideration of extra-textual matter only if a term is ambiguous.97 Because
it saw the words "pollutant," and "release" as unambiguous,98 the Deni
Associates majority refused to consider the drafting history of the pollution
exclusion, nontextual evidence of the intent and understanding of the
parties, or the purpose of the pollution exclusion and the CGL policy.
The drafting history, ifconsidered relevant, would have implications for
the common understanding of the meaning of the absolute pollution
exclusion. For example, there is an oft-quoted passage of an exchange

supra note 90, at 940-42 (noting that "meaning" is determined by the intent of the parties).
94. See supra notes 3-18 and accompanying text; see also Allen v. Prudential Property &
Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 807 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
95. See infra notes 143-63 and accompanying text (discussing 20th century contract
jurisprudence and consistency of reasonable expectations principle with modem contract law).
96. See ROBERTE. KEETON, JUDGING 67 (1990). Judge Keeton then defines terms he uses in
the book in some detail as an aid to the reader. Even in long and detailed form contracts, such
extensive effort at defining terms is seldom found or practically effective, particularly when much
of the contracting memorialized by forms occurs quickly in conversation, phone call, and wire,
without "painstaking" study of the definitions (or most other parts ofthe contract) prior to entry into
an agreement.
97. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397,403 (4th DCA
1996), affd, 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
98. See id.
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before the Texas Insurance Department in which an industry representative
stated that the language of the exclusion was drafted with unrealistic
breadth to ensure its effectiveness and that it would not be literally

enforced against insureds in cases where doing so would be inconsistent

with basic understandings about the policy.99 Similarly, the overall purpose
and the customary use of liability insurance would seemingly be relevant
to interpreting policy language in a given context. However, the Fourth
District majority in Deni Associates precluded consideration of this
material since it found the pollution exclusion clear on its face.
The Deni Associates majority, like Florida law generally, was unclear
about whether background or contextual material is the type of parol or
extrinsic evidence that is barred absent ambiguity. Presumably, the Deni
Associates majority believed so. However, the modem trend is to permit
courts to consider extrinsic evidence as an aid to assessing whether
disputed language is ambiguous.'10 In addition, contracts scholars such as
E. Allan Farnsworth differentiate background context from extrinsic
evidence. For example, is it impermissible extrinsic evidence if the court
appreciates that a contract was formed during wartime? Prominent modem
contracts scholars would say no,101 as would most courts. 10 2 Courts are
divided, however, when the degree of contextual information expands.
When contextual information becomes more peculiar to the disputing
parties (e.g., how things were done in the past, what someone said, failure
to object to an undertaking), this is generally regarded as extrinsic matter

admissible only if contract language is facially ambiguous. However, most
courts will consider usage in trade or course of dealing between the parties
even though this is viewed by many courts as a type of "extrinsic"
evidence.'13
99. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § T1.6, at 116-17 (1998 Supp).
100. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
101. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, §§ 7.8,7.9.
102. See id. §§ 7.12, 7.13; SCHABER & ROHWER, supra note 87, § 94, at 173 ("Evidence is
admissible to show the background and circumstances in which a contract was negotiated....");
Abraham, supra note 55, -at540 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (considering extrinsic matter to determine whether contract
text was ambiguous, as representative of modem majority trend)); see also Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v.
A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying New York law) (discussing the
prevalence of the modem, expanded use of extrinsic evidence, but noting New York's more
traditional approach); Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988)
(following Pacific Gas & Electric as required in a federal case applying California law but
criticizing the same on the ground that a more traditional doctrine should be followed, allowing a
court to consider extrinsic matter only where the contract language is facially ambiguous). But see
SCHABER & ROHWER, supra note 87, § 94, at 174 (stating that Pacific Gas & Electric stands for the
proposition that extrinsic matter may be used only to argue for a meaning for which the contract
language is "reasonably susceptible").
103. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, §§ 7.12,7.13; STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.2; see also
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The Deni Associates majority in the court of appeal was clearly
motivated by fears of judicial activism-stating that courts could not
"rewrite" unambiguous contract language to reach a preferred result."
Courts must be mindful not to "torture" policy language in favor of the
insured.'0 5 As the court stated:
When a policy clearly defines a term, however, it is error for
the court to engage in further construction of the defined term
under the rule of plain and ordinary meaning. The purpose of
defining a contractual term is to make clear that the parties
intend something in addition to the plain, ordinary meaning of
the defined term. Hence, by finding an ambiguity in the
general toxicity versus special toxicity rationale applied, the
trial court has failed to give effect to the clear meaning of the
actual exclusion defined in the policy. The court's
construction has effectually created alimitation on the breadth
of the exclusion and added a coverage that the insurer had
clearly excluded. "

Despite its view of linguistic clarity, and its aversion to the reasonable
expectations approach, the Deni Associates majority set the stage for the
Supreme Court of Florida to consider in detail the reasonable expectations
doctrine and the scope of the absolute pollution exclusion:
Nevertheless, we also recognize that CGL policies are widely
and generally used in Florida. We perceive, as demonstrated
by the two summary judgments reviewed in this decision, that
there is an opinion in the bench and bar that these categorical
exclusions of pollution coverage are ambiguous. Therefore,

SCHABER & ROHWER, supra note 87, § 91, at 167-68.

The [parol evidence] rule does not preclude use of extrinsic evidence offered for
the purpose of lending meaning to contract terms ....
The use of extrinsic
evidence to establish usage of trade, course of dealing or course of performance
is not barred by the parol evidence rule. The reason the rule does not apply in the
situations described is simply that they do not involve evidence of an extrinsic
agreement offered for the purpose of adding to or modifying the terms of the
writing. Course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade are part of
the parties' agreement by implication. They are not the subject of any extrinsic
agreement between the parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. See DeniAssocs., 678 So. 2d at401 (quoting United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338
So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)).

105. See id. at 401,403.
106. Id. at 403.
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to enable the supreme court itself to decide the issue of
ambiguity and consider the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, we certify the following question to the court:
Where an ambiguity is shown to exist in a CGLpolicy, is the
court limited to resolving the ambiguity infavor of coverage,
or may the court apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations of the insured to resolve ambiguities in CGL
policies?"°7
The Fourth District's DeniAssociatesmajority acknowledged arole for
a "reasonable person" analysis in that Florida law follows the traditional
rule of insurance contract interpretation "which requires that policy
language be read as it would be understood by reasonable people, i.e.,
given its plain and ordinary meaning."1 8 Judge Stone concurred in part and
dissented in part, voting in favor of Deni Associates (the architectural firm
with the moving mishap) and concurring in the result denying coverage to
the Fogg partnership for the errant insecticide spraying."° In particular,
Judge Stone was willing to examine the historical background and drafting
history of the pollution exclusion and the purpose of the exclusion. 10
Judge Stone's view of language placed emphasis not only on the dictionary
definition of a term but upon its connotative value: "First, I would note that
the term 'pollution' is generally understood as referring to a more
widespread exposure of the environment to a polluting substance than
occurred here. In this case, the policy in question does not sufficiently alert
the insured that this is not the case." '
In addition, Judge Stone argued for construing policy language
according to reasonable expectations of the insured, rather than deciding
policy meaning on the basis of dictionary or policy definitions alone.112 But
Judge Stone's interest in adopting a reasonable expectations approach was
premised on the view that a more nuanced view of the absolute pollution
exclusion would find it ambiguous as applied.11 3 Judge Stone did not argue
for adoption of the pure Keeton doctrine of policyholder expectations
trumping unambiguous policy language.
Judge Warner concurred specially and in a short, somewhat cryptic
opinion, appeared to argue for adoption of the Keeton version of
reasonable expectations. 114 Judge Warner also saw the reasonable

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 403-04.
Id. at401.
See id. at 404 (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 404-05 (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 405. (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 405-06 (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 406 (Warner, J., concurring).
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489

expectations doctrine as a two-way street: "It would seem to me that an
insurer could argue successfully the reasonable expectation test to exclude
coverage in circumstances where it has heretofore been construed in favor
of the insured."'" 5
Judge Klein concurred in part and dissented in part, finding that the
pollution exclusion
clearly did not preclude coverage in the Deni
116
Associates case.
I, quite frankly, do not think that even State Farm intended
this exclusion to leave its insured without coverage for the
type of accident which occurred here. These insurance
policies are not called comprehensive general liability policies
for nothing. If they were intended to exclude liability for all
of the types of claims which the majority would exclude,
there would be no reasonable certainty as to coverage, and
insureds would only discover their lack of coverage as
everyday mishaps occurred.'
Notwithstanding that CGL policies are now "Commercial" General
Liability policies, Judge Klein's position is supported by approximately
half of the key decisions in other states, which have mitigated the textual
breadth of the absolute pollution exclusion according to the court's
common sense view of what a CGL policy should reasonably cover." 8 In
the alternative, Judge Klein saw the exclusion as ambiguous, in part
because of the division of the courts on the issue." 9
2. The Supreme Court Decision
a. Oral Argument: Insurer Stridency and Judicial Skepticism
Deni Associates was argued before the Supreme Court of Florida on
September 11, 1997. Argument before what then appeared to be a closely
divided Court illustrated the difficulty of the absolute pollution exclusion
and the potential utility of expectations analysis. The oral argument placed
in stark relief the Achilles Heel of the insurance industry in seeking a broad

115. Id. (Warner, J., concurring).
116. See id. (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. See id. at 407 (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing cases); see also
STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 1.6 (reviewing caselaw of "absolute" pollution exclusion and finding that
courts are split between the literal enforcement of broad exclusionary language and the common
sense view that every claim involving caustic material is not necessarily a "pollution" claim).
119. See DeniAssocs., 678 So. 2d. at 407-08 (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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and literal application of the absolute pollution exclusion.
Recall that the exclusion applies to any "irritant" or "chemical" as well
as to "smoke" and "soot" and "waste. 1 20 These terms are obviously
capable of abroad reading, one that could place outside coverage any claim
involving one of these substances, even if the claim was otherwise one of
ordinary negligence. For example, an automobile accident often results in
the "release" or "discharge" of oil, gasoline, or radiator fluid. To the extent
that the accident can be said to "consist of' the presence of these
substances or in some way be "caused by" the release (such as when the
gasoline becomes ignited after an accident), these claims would be
excluded "pollution" claims under this approach to insurance policy
construction-a result at odds with most observers' common sense view.
Similarly, a by now well-known hypothetical designed to test the
application of the pollution exclusion asks whether a "slip-and-fall" claim
against a grocer is excluded if the patron slips on spilled bleach rather than
spilled ketchup.' At the Deni Associates oral argument, the Supreme
Court of Florida pressed this hypothetical with interesting results. 122 Justice
Ben Overton asked State Farm's counsel whether the pollution exclusion
would bar a claim if a patron slipped on ammonia leaking from the Deni
Associates blueprint machine.'23 State Farm answered without hesitation
that it regarded such a simple and traditional slip-and-fall claim as
excluded because the absolute pollution exclusion was "intended to be
broad." 24 Justice Overton pressed the point, asking with some incredulity
whether slipping on soap was covered while slipping on ammonia was
not1 25 State Farm counsel continued to take the position that the ammonia
slip-and-fall was excluded, prompting Justice Leander Shaw to ask
whether in that case the CGL policy was an "illusory contract" since it
appeared to cover such ordinary negligence but then failed to provide
coverage when the negligence involved the spill and failure to mop up
120. See supra text accompanying note 76.
121. This is the hypothetical asked by the Texas Insurance Commission at hearings on the
absolute pollution exclusion. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § T1.6, at 116-18 (1998 Supp.). In
response, an industry representative agreed it would be ludicrous to apply the proposed absolute
pollution exclusion to bar the bleach slip claim when the ketchup slip claim was covered but he also
admitted that a literal application of the exclusion would bring this result because the insurance
industry overdrafted it. See id. The insurer representative quickly suggested that responsible
insurers would not attempt such literal enforcement of the exclusion. See id.
122. Oral Argument, Deni Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Cas. Ins. Co. 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla.
1998) (Nos. 89-115, 89-300) (Question of Hon. Ben Overton).
123. Id. (Question of Hon. Ben Overton).
124. Id. (Question of Hon. Ben Overton and Response of Elizabeth Russo, Esq.). State Farm
counsel quickly added that she was unaware of any actual slip-and-fall case in which the pollution
exclusion had been asserted as a defense and suggested that court discussion of such a hypothetical
would be in the nature of dicta or an advisory opinion. See id.
125. See id. (Question of Hon. Ben Overton).
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When Farm Bureau's counsel rose to argue Fogg, Justice Overton
reiterated the slip-and-fall hypothetical. 27 Farm Bureau counsel argued that
the slip claim was covered because the injury was not caused by pollution
but by wetness,1 2' a less rigid and more reasonable response than that given
by State Farm. Justice Harry Lee Anstead pounced on the inconsistency
between the State Farm and Farm Bureau positions and asked Farm Bureau
counsel why the conflict between the insurers on this point was not
evidence of the ambiguity of the absolute
pollution exclusion and "highly
129
indicative of a serious problem."'
Farm Bureau counsel dealt with the question as well as could be
expected and suggested that the "toxic nature" of the injury should be the
controlling factor in determining whether the pollution exclusion
applied. 30 Nonetheless, State Farm's absolutist position on the exclusion
appeared at the time to have dealt the insurance industry a mortal blow.
Unless Florida's high court is to tacitly permit insurers to deny coverage
to slip-and-fall and other "ordinary" negligence claims incidently involving
irritants, it must seemingly use ambiguity analysis, a version of the
reasonable expectations doctrine, or contextual construction. There must
be a limit to the literal reach of the language of the absolute pollution
exclusion so that the claim arising from a wet floor is not excluded merely
because the wet substance is a chemical irritant as well.
b. The Supreme Court of Florida's Surprisingly Superficial Opinion
If nothing else, the supreme court's DeniAssociates opinion (released
January 29, 1998, some four and one-half months after oral argument),
proves the adage that one can never predict the outcome of a decision
according to the content and tone of the oral argument. During oral
argument, the court seemed annoyed with the insurance industry position
of a pollution exclusion so broad it barred coverage for items clearly
considered staple CGL policy claims only a few years earlier. In particular,
State Farm's absolutist, hyperliteral position, the divergent interpretations

126. See id. (Question of Hon. Leander Shaw and Response of Elizabeth Russo, Esq.).
127. See id.(Question of Hon. Ben Overton).
128. See id. (Question of Hon. Ben Overton and Response of Bonita Kneeland, Esq.).
129. Id. (Question of Hon. Harry Lee Anstead and Response of Bonita Kneeland, Esq.).
To one watching this exchange, it appeared to be the death knell for the insurers. When
coverage was subsequently excluded in the court's written opinion, see infra notes 99-106 and
accompanying text, it was this quotation with which Deni Associates began its petition for
rehearing. See PetitionerDeniAssociates
of Florida'sMotionforRehearing,711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla.
1998) (No. 89-115).
130. See Oral Argument, Deni Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d
1135 (Fla. 1998) (Nos. 89-115, 89-300).
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of the insurers, and the seemingly unfair and surprising absence of
coverage for claims that clearly were something quite distinct from Times
Beach, Missouri 3 ' or Love Canal' 32 all suggested a decision that would in
some way limit the pollution exclusion, even if the intermediate appellate
results were to stand.
Instead, the supreme court issued an opinion addressing none of the
concerns it voiced during oral argument. Rather, the court focused
narrowly on the pollution exclusion language, read it extremely literally,
and concluded that this unrealistically literal reading was so clear as to
preclude alternative meanings."' The reasonable expectations principle
was considered inappropriate for assisting the analysis." The court
rejected reasonable expectations analysis curtly, but in language that
suggested the supreme court harbored the same misunderstanding about the
doctrine held by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.' 35
Despite the closeness of prior decisions regarding the former "sudden
and accidental" pollution exclusion, and the seemingly inconsistent
positions outlined by the insurers, the supreme court's holding, analysis,
and rhetoric in Deni Associates was nearly unanimously in the insurers'
favor. Despite the prospect that under State Farm's view of the absolute
pollution exclusion, the grocery store slip-and-fall and other "ordinary"
negligence claims incidently involving irritants would be excluded from
CGL policy coverage, 36 the court accepted the insurers' construction of the
exclusion, denied coverage to Deni Associates and the Fogg partnership,
and rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine.'37 The court also refused
to use ambiguity analysis, or contextual construction, to limit the literal
reach of the language of the absolute pollution exclusion.'
It was equally surprising that the supreme court's decision was
overwhelmingly one-sided, with five justices ruling in favor of State Farm.
The only dissenters were Justice Wells and Justice Overton, the author of
the court's original pro-coverage decision in Dimmitt Chevrolet,Inc. v.

131. Times Beach, Missouri, a town along the Mississippi River, was so badly polluted by
dioxin that evacuation of much of the town and expensive soil remediation was required as a result
of the spraying of polluted chemicals onto dirt roads in the area as a dust suppressant. For
additional background on theTimes Beach disaster, see ContinentalInsuranceCos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical& ChemicalCo., 842 F.2d 977, 979-81 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law).
132. Love Canal was a waterway polluted by manufacturing discharges, again forcing some
evacuation of the adjacent neighborhood near Erie, Pennsylvania.
133. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138-39.
134. See id. at 1140.
135. See id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 121-26.
137. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1139-41.
138. See id. at 1138-39.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/2

30

Stempel: Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Constru
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLLUTION EXCLUSION

SoutheasternFidelityInsuranceCorp.,139 and the principal dissenter when
the court reversed itself on rehearing and found no coverage for gradual
pollution due to the qualified pollution exclusion formerly found in CGL
policies." Meanwhile, Justice Harding, who had allied himself with
Justice Overton in the original Dimmitt Chevroletopinion, 41 did not join
the limited dissent in favor of coverage for Deni Associates. The supreme
court, like the Fourth District Court of Appeal, unanimously found no
coverage for the botched crop spraying in Fogg.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Deni Associates
featured split views, substantial discussion of contract law and the
expectations approach, and a powerful dissent. By contrast, the Deni
Associates dissent in the Supreme Court of Florida was a comparative
shrug of the shoulders, with Justice Wells merely adopting a court of
appeal dissent by reference and suggesting support for a reasonable
expectations approach, but not endorsing the doctrine explicitly." The
supreme court opinion presented a more streamlined analysis than what
was presented by the intermediate court, thereby making its
misunderstanding of the reasonable expectations doctrine less obvious than
that of the court of appeal.' 43 The court also failed to discuss (much less
refute) the reasonable expectations doctrine at any length, and in
dismissing the certified question stated:
[T]he certified question... asks whether the doctrine of
reasonable expectations should be applied to interpret CGL
139. See 17 Fla. L. Weekly S579, S582 (Fla. Sept. 3, 1992) (finding "sudden and accidental"
qualified pollution exclusion to bar coverage only for intentional pollution where damage was
expected).
140. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 706 (Fla.
1993) (Overton, J., dissenting); see also id. at 711 (Overton, J., dissenting from order denying
rehearing).
141. Fellow Dimmitt Chevrolet dissenter Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett was subsequently
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and was no longer on the
Supreme Court of Florida at the time of the Deni Associates decision.
142. The entirety of Justice Wells' concurring and dissenting opinion is as follows:
I concur as to the spraying case involving Florida Farm Bureau. I dissent as to the
case involving the printing machine. I adopt the well-reasoned dissent of Judge
Klein in the district court's opinion. I believe to do otherwise allows the exclusion
to swallow the coverage, rendering the policy to no longer be a comprehensive
general liability policy as it was sold to be by State Farm.
DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. See id. at 1140 (referring to reasonable expectations doctrine as one that makes coverage
turn on "insured's subjective expectations" (emphasis added). The court reached this conclusion
notwithstanding Keeton's clear enunciation that the issue is one of the policyholder's objectively
reasonable expectations). See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
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policies. Under this doctrine, the insured'sexpectationsas to
the scope of coverage is upheld provided that such
expectations are objectively reasonable.
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. There is no need for it if the policy provisions
are ambiguous because in Florida ambiguities are construed
against the insurer. To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous
provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon
which the premiums are charged.
Construing insurance policies upon a determination as to
whether the insured'ssubjective expectationsare reasonable
can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation.144
As the italicized language shows, the supreme court, like the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, appears to confuse the standard for assessing
reasonable expectations. At the outset of the language quoted above, the
court appears to appreciate that the Keeton doctrine requires that the
insured have an objectively reasonable basis for expecting coverage in the
situation at issue. 45 But only a few sentences later, the court appears to see
the doctrine as resting on the subjective expectations of the individual
insured of the instant case. 146
The objective-subjective references can be reconciled in that the court
probably meant that it did not want to engage in the difficult and
burdensome process of determining whether the insured's actual
expectations of coverage (which exist by definition if there is a coverage
dispute) were objectively reasonable. However, the court's assessment
misses the mark even when read charitably. According to the reasonable
expectations doctrine, a reviewing court need not be concerned with the
actual subjective expectations of the insured.' 47 What is important is
whether the admittedly mythical reasonable person in the position of the
insured would have expected coverage under the circumstances of the
case.148 This requires no greater judicial effort than that already put forth
when a court seeks to determine if a linguistic term is "clear" or
"ambiguous." Additionally, it is hard to see how expectations analysis will
be any less predictable than the textual regime endorsed by the court.
Different courts have divided dramatically over whether "sudden and

144. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 803 (Utah 1992)). The court also stated that
"[t]here is still great uncertainty as to the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine, its scope, and
the details of its application." Id. (quoting Allen, 839 P.2d at 803).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Keeton, supra note 2, at 961-64.
148. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/2

32

Stempel: Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Constru
LIABILFTY INSURANCE POLLUTION EXCLUSION

495

accidental" pollution must be abrupt, whether the absolute pollution
exclusion at issue in Deni Associates is ambiguous, and whether
"damages"
covered by liability insurance includes environmental cleanup
14 9
costs.

The DeniAssociatescourt left open the possibility of coverage in future
cases resembling the grocery store slip-and-fall alluded to at oral
argument. 50 The court did this by stating that courts would not enforce an
absurd result."' The court defended the logic of invoking the pollution
exclusion in the instant case because ammonia and Ethion are both
classified as pollutants by regulatory authorities. 52
The Deni Associates decision emphasizes the retreat of reasonable
expectations analysis, perhaps even more than Utah's rejection of the
doctrine in Allen v. PrudentialProperty& CasualtyInsuranceCo.,15 3 and
Oklahoma's acceptance of a watered down version of the Keeton
doctrine.1 14 In Deni Associates, the highest court of America's fourth
largest state firmly dismissed expectations analysis despite a fact setting

149. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 1.4 (noting that states are evenly split on the question of
whether "sudden and accidental" language of qualified pollution exclusion precludes coverage for
gradual discharge not expected to cause harm); id. § T1.6 (stating that courts are divided over
whether absolute pollution exclusion precludes coverage for claim arising out of smoke, carbon
monoxide); id. § 12.5 (stating that courts are divided nearly equally concerning whether a CGL
must cover as "damage" environmental cleanup costs required by government order).
150. See Deni Assocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140.
151. Thecourtstated:
We see no reason to address what might be the holding under certain
hypothetical situations if we interpret the pollution exclusion clause as it is written
because none of those facts are before us. Suffice it to say that insurance policies
will not be construed to reach an absurd result.
Id.
152. See id. at 1141.
153. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). Allen is perhaps the most comprehensive anti-reasonable
expectations case to date. When the Aliens' two-year-old son was injured by a pot of boiling water
spilled by Mrs. Allen, the Aliens sought coverage for the son's liability claim against the parents.
See id. at 799-800. Prudential.refused payment, however, citing the "household exclusion," a
common provision in homeowner's policies that bars coverage for claims made against the
policyholder by other members of the household. See id. at 800. Despite its extensive discussion
of the expectations principle,Allen is ultimately unpersuasive. The decision both misconstrues the
realities of the consumer market for insurance and sets forth a most problematic argument based on
a misperception of separation of powers. The Allen court took the view that it would violate the
American notion of government structure if a court did not enforce literally the terms of an
insurance contract approved by state regulators. See Stempel, supranote 5, at_ (criticizingAllen
at length).
154. See Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 868
(Okla. 1996) (adopting reasonable expectations approach to construing insurance policies only
where the language in question is ambiguous).
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conducive to the doctrine's application. Compared to the welcoming
embrace of expectations analysis in the 1970s, the 1990s reaction of courts
seems tantamount to deportation of the Keeton doctrine.
IV. EVALUATING DENIASSOCIATES AND THE ANTI-REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS RATIONALE

A. Pureand ContaminatedReasoning: The Errorsof the Deni
Associates Opinion
1. Slanting the Inquiry to Benefit the Insurer
The Supreme Court of Florida opinion began with a brief recitation of
the facts of the two cases, emphasizing the degree to which the toxic or
irritating nature of the spilled chemicals (ammonia from the blueprint
machine in Deni Associates and insecticide in the crop spraying of Fogg)
contributed to the losses underlying the claims against the insureds.155 The
court noted that the certified question asking whether Florida would adopt
the reasonable expectations approach in cases of ambiguous policy
language was something of a non sequitur in that it "presupposes an
ambiguity, whereas the court held that no such ambiguity existed."' 156 But
the court accepted the certification, largely because it wished to address the
issue of the pollution exclusion: "[w]e believe that the legal efficacy of the
pollution15 7exclusion is an important issue which should be decided by this
Court.'

Framing the question in this manner accrued to the benefit of the
insurer. It suggested that finding for the policyholder not only merely
limited the application of the pollution exclusion for these two
comparatively minor incidents,'58 but also imperilled the "efficacy" of an
important policy provision added in response to the massive pollution
liability litigation of the 1970s and 1980s. 5 9 So phrased, the question
would seem to beg for a pro-insurer answer. If the absolute pollution
exclusion had no "efficacy," then perhaps the insurance industry remained

155. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1136-37.

156. Id.
at 1137.
157. Id.
158. Ido not mean to denigrate the seriousness of the plaintiffs' claims in DeniAssociatesand
Fogg. The persons mistakenly sprayed with insecticide in Fogg were seriously injured. However,
neither the Deni Associates nor the Fogg claims involved widespread or long lasting damage

outside the immediacy of the incident. By contrast, claims more easily classified as pollution
incidents mayinvolve contamination of acreage or water systems that extends for acres and decades.
159. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § T.1.1, at 825 (Main Volume 1994); id. § T1.6, at 113-14
(Supp. 1998) (describing background history of qualified and absolute pollution exclusions).
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in the throes of the large, long-tailed, unanticipated coverage obligations
that had created the hard insurance market of the mid-1980s. These
coverage issues threatened to bring down Lloyd's and the London Market,
and linked today's insurers to gradual pollution dating back as much as a
century. 6°
Whether consciously or not, the Deni Associates court accepted the
tacit "parade of horribles" or Armageddon implied by insurers should
coverage be found. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Supreme Court of Florida
erroneously assumed that a vote for coverage was a vote for an ineffective
pollution exclusion. One might just as easily and more appropriately view
DeniAssociatesas a case testing the degree to which an industry-imposed
exclusion could be applied to ordinary business activity not commonly
thought of as pollution and not contemplated for exclusion at the time the
policy was issued. Had the case been framed in this latter, more apt
manner, the consequence of finding coverage would be simple resolution
of the dispute without any lurking threat to insurer solvency.
2. Jumping on a Rickety Bandwagon: The Court Credulously Accepts
the Insurance Industry's Scorecard Regarding the Pollution Exclusion
and Misunderstands the Nature of Pollution Exclusion Precedent
Again demonstrating that it saw the case as one about the general
enforceability of the pollution exclusion rather than a case about the reach
of the pollution exclusion to nonpollution activity, the Deni Associates
court began its legal analysis by noting that "[a] substantial majority of...
courts have concluded that the pollution exclusion is clear and
unambiguous so as to preclude coverage for all pollution related
liability. ' 161 In the footnote accompanying this quotation, the supreme
court noted that the insurers and "their amici have cited more than 100
cases from 36 other states which have applied the plain language of the
pollution exclusion clause to deny coverage."' 62
The court's invocation of the "box score" of pollution exclusion
litigation reflects the success of the insurance industry's professional
amicus, the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association (IELA), a
trade group which submitted the key amicus brief to which the court
refers. 63 The approach of the IELA amicus brief is one of overwhelming
the reader by numbers. As a coordinator of the insurers' national efforts to

160. See generallyELIZABTMHLUESSENHOP&MARTINMAYER, RISKY BUSNESS: AN INSIDER'S
ACCOUNT OFTHE DISASTER AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON (1995).

161. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
162. Id. at 1137 n.2.
163. See Brief Amicus Curie of the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association, Deni
Assocs. (No. 89-115).
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further expand the scope of the pollution exclusion, IELA has cataloged
even the most obscure pollution exclusion cases, and can muster in one
brief all of the industry's victories, even unreported cases, such as those
from local courts with limited jurisdiction. The resulting list of "more than
100 cases," composing a twenty-seven page appendix to the JELA brief is
impressive, but should not have influenced the DeniAssociatescourt to the
degree it did.
Although a good deal of the impact of the IELA amicus brief results
from courts' siding with the insurers on the reach of the exclusion, the
thrust of the brief is misleading and partially fallacious. An example is the
issue of how to count and classify the cases. Many of the pro-insurer cases
cited in the IELA brief involved the qualified "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion language.1" If one is a pure textualist, the
determination that one clause was held unambiguous by some courts is of
no utility in determining whether a similar but different clause is clear or
ambiguous.
Looking at an "apples vs. apples" comparison, it is true that many
courts construing the absolute pollution exclusion have deemed it textually
clear. But a similar number of courts have either characterized the
extremely broad exclusionary language as ambiguous, or have failed to
apply the exclusion to a variety of liability claims involving irritants,
chemicals, smoke, gas, and waste. The IELA brief asserts that courts
enforcing the absolute pollution exclusion not only constitute a majority,
but have rejected any possibility that the language is ambiguous. However,
what these cases really decided was that the pollution exclusion was
enforceable and precluded coverage in a particular case. As observed by
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York:
In [the case cited by the insurer] claims were filed against the
insured municipality for improper disposal of toxic material.
[The insured] argued that the pollution exclusion in its
liability policy was ambiguous as to coverage of these claims,
because there was a question as to whether the [insured] was
responsible for dumping the toxic material. The [New York]
Court of Appeals held that the language of the applicable
policy's exclusion was not ambiguous on this point.
Thus.... the New York Court of Appeals did not hold that
pollution exclusions are unambiguous for all purposes. It
merely refused to find that the pollution exclusion at issue
there was ambiguous with respect to claims arising out of the

164. The policy at issue in Deni Associates contained the "absolute pollution exclusion,"
which does not use the "sudden and accidental" language. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
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dumping of environmental waste when the identity of the
party responsible for dumping the waste was in doubt. 6
As more succinctly put by the New York Court of Appeals itself, pollution
exclusion "[c]lauses can, of course, be ambiguous in one context and not
another." 166
Thus, for example, in the cases cited in the IELA brief and seized upon
by the Supreme Court of Florida, one finds the exclusion effective to bar
coverage for release of petroleum from underground storage tanks, 67
spraying of oil by a contractor,1 68 hauling and storage of hazardous
waste,169 storage of nuclear waste,70 cleanup of groundwater
contamination, 7 ' generalized spraying of pesticide throughout a
municipality,'72 county-wide mosquito control spraying,' 73 fumes given off
by the process of "rubber de-nuding,"'' T sick building syndrome,'75 and the

165. See GarfieldSlope, 973 F. Supp. at 337.
166. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 512 (N.Y. 1993)
(citations omitted).
167. See, e.g., McGuirk Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 93 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1996), cited with approvalin DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
168. See, e.g., Tri County Serv. Co., v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 873 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.
1993), cited with approvalin Deni Assocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
169. See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991)
(applying Pennsylvania law), cited with approvalin DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1139.
170. See, e.g., Constitution State Ins. Co. v. Iso-Tex, Inc., 61 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1995)
(applying Texas law), cited with approvalin DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140.
171. See, e.g., Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double D Mgmt. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
cited with approval in DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141.
172. See, e.g., Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. City of Woodhaven, 476 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. 1991),
cited with approval in DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141.
173. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. McNichols, 77 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1955) (finding no coverage
because mosquito pesticide spraying company's liability policy excluded coverage for '"injury or
damage... caused directly or indirectly by chemicals or dusting powder"'), cited with approval
in DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141.
174. See, e.g., Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992)
(applying Ohio law), cited with approvalin DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140. In Park-Ohio,the
Sixth Circuit was divided on the applicability of the exclusion despite the widely dispersed fumes
from the rubber de-nuding operation. See Park-Ohio,975 F.2d at 1224 (Guy, J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., West Am. Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg, 925 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1996),
cited with approval in Deni Assocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138. In Band & Desenberg, as in most sick
building syndrome cases, workers on the site claimed that "contaminants in the building's air
caused them to suffer from a series of symptoms" because of "air-borne contaminants" in the
ventilation system. Band & Desenberg, 925 F. Supp. at 760. The Band & Desenberg court
described this condition as "indoor air pollution." Id. at 761 n.1.
The DeniAssociates court also cited with approval a case that denied coverage on pollution
exclusion grounds when tennants sued their landlord for injuries due to carbon monoxide poisoning
resulting from a negligently installed and maintained furnace. See Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 648 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). Although the two situations have similarities, the
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movement and spilling of mercury. 176 Not surprisingly, when one looks
closely at the insurer victories chronicled by IELA and cited by the Deni
Associates court, one finds the pollution exclusion applied to prevent
coverage for "pollution" as the term is traditionally defined and understood
by the reasonable layperson.
There are, of course, a few cases in other states that, like Deni
Associates, apply the exclusion to mishaps that, but for some involvement
of an irritant, traditionally were considered mere garden-variety
accidents. 177 But the bulk of the cases invoked by the insurers look like
pollution in that the liability claims against the insured stemmed from
widespread, serious, or long-lasting dispersal of foul substances, often over
an extended time period."7 For example, in American States InsuranceCo.
v. F.H.S., Inc.,'179 quoted at length in DeniAssociates,the insured operated
a cold storage warehouse. 10 "Ammonia leaked from a pressure relief valve
on F.H.S.'s refrigeration system at the warehouse... [and] [a]s a result of
this ammonia leak, a number of people in the surrounding area were treated
at local hospitals and fifteen people made claims." '' Thus, although both
F.H.S. and Deni Associates involve ammonia, the F.H.S. situation better

loss and claims in Bernhardtcan be said to result from improper management, supervision, or
repair. By contrast, sick building syndrome is more widely dispersed, more intractably a part of the
property, less isolated, and less remediable or reversible. In other words, the sick building claim is
more analogous to the traditional understanding of a pollution claim.
176. See, e.g., Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Grandadam, 656 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995),
cited with approval in DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137. Note, however, that in Grandadam,the
mercury at issue was not the result of commercial discharge but was released as part of a minor
child's prank or carelessness. See Grandadam,656 N.E.2d at788. However, the mercury had been
removed from the insured's home and transferred to the home of the claimant prior to the
apparently dispersed release of the chemical in the claimant's home, suggesting abroad but perhaps
erroneous construction of the exclusion by the Grandadamcourt. See id.
177. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (pollution exclusion bans coverage for carbon monoxide claim arising out of
defective furnace installation); Shaliman Contractors, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 975 F. Supp.
1450 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (last print).
178. For example, the claim in Grandadam, in which the minor released mercury into the
claimant's home, despite its closeness, looks more like a pollution claim than Deni Associates or
Fogg. Without the release of mercury in Grandadam,there is no tort. Grandadamis not a case
involving negligent conduct where a contaminant was incidently involved. Release of the
contaminant is the negligence. Spilling Pepsi is unlikely to prompt a claim worthy of coverage
litigation. But the Deni Associates and Fogg torts may have given rise to significant claims under
slightly different circumstances (e.g., Deni Associates' blueprint machine tips off the office
balcony; the Fogg partnership's helicopter crashes into a farmhouse).
179. 843 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
180. See id. at 188.
181. Id. This factual aspect of F.H.S. was not quoted by the Deni Associates court, which
instead opted to quote the sanctity of contract rhetoric of the F.H.S. Court. See DeniAssocs., 711
So. 2d at 1138.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/2

38

Stempel: Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Constru
LIABILITYINSURANCEPOLUUTIONEXCLUSION

fits the average person's understanding of a "release" or "discharge" of
pollutants than does the smaller, more confined, more episodic and
contained spill of Deni Associates.
To say that an exclusion is not so facially unclear as to be deemed
ambiguous as a matter of law is hardly the same thing as saying that the
exclusion will bar coverage for broken containers during an office move
just as it bars coverage for years of sewage discharge despoiling a river. A
court might well find the pollution exclusion clear when applying the
exclusion to industrial waste and discharge-but this hardly demonstrates
that the same court would apply the exclusion to blueprint machine spills
and isolated mishaps when applying chemicals in the ordinary course of
business. One can seriously question whether a reasonable expectations
jurisprudence that employs the expectations concept only after first
determining that disputed policy analysis is ambiguous standing alone is
anything new at all. It adds nothing to the policyholder's quiver of
arguments for coverage beyond that already existing through the contra
proferentem principle, although it perhaps provides insurers with a chance
to avoid liability even when guilty of drafting ambiguous language.
For example, the DeniAssociatescourt cited three of the IELA amicus
brief cases for the proposition that the exclusion was unambiguous1 2 and
included a pithy parenthetical quote referring to the judicial trend rejecting
ambiguity of the pollution exclusion clause as a matter of law.'83
Unfortunately, each of these cases on closer examination shows that the
courts applied the exclusion to a fact situation more like conventional
pollution than the DeniAssociatesandFogg coverage matters' 1 4 The cases
cited, although employing dicta stating that the exclusion is not ambiguous,
clearly do not extend the exclusion as far as the Supreme Court of Florida
did. Read with sensitivity, the cited cases (and many others in the IELA
182. The court cited Grandadam, 656 N.E.2d at 787; McGuirk Sand & Gravel v. Meridian
Mutual Insurance Co., 559 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); and Tri County Service Co. v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 873 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1993). See DeniAssocs., 711 So.
2d at 1137.
183. SeeDeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
184. See supra notes 128, 130 & 137 and accompanying text. In addition, a more recent and
authoritative Illinois case than Grandadam rejected a literalist interpretation of the pollution
exclusion cause. In American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997), the
policyholder apartment owner was sued by tenants for loss arising out of carbon monoxide
poisoning from a defective furnace. See id. at 74. Although carbon monoxide is clearly a"pollutant"
as defined in the exclusion (because it is an irritant, contaminant, fume, vapor, chemical, and
waste), the Koloms court correctly viewed the suits concerning the carbon monoxide poisoning as
covered because they sounded more in the nature of a garden variety claim against the landlord for
failure to maintain premises in a safe condition. See id. at 79.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a similar view of carbon monoxide claims
in late 1997, but this decision was not noted by the Supreme Court of Florida. See Western Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 999-1000 (Mass. 1997).
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amicus brief) merely say that the pollution exclusion is neither ambiguous
nor against public policy when applied to claims that fit the common sense
notion of "pollution."
3. Misunderstanding Contract Law
The DeniAssociatescourt briefly discussed precedent that, for reasons
discussed later, actually weighed in favor of the policyholders. The court
mischaracterized cases finding coverage by stating that the court "cannot
accept the conclusion reached by certain courts that because of its
ambiguity the pollution exclusion clause only excludes environmental or
industrial pollution."'85 It then cited three cases that found coverage not on
the basis of textual ambiguity, but on the basis of the greater contextual
meaning of the exclusion in light of the intent of the parties and the
purpose of the CGL policy. 86
The Deni Associates majority then cited a case suggesting that failure
to apply the pollution exclusion literally was an improper "rewriting" of
the CGL policy. 87 In addition, this case-and this line of thought-begs
the question of what constitutes unauthorized judicial "rewriting" of a
contract. The Deni Associates court starts from the proposition that
contract text is to be given strictly literal meaning without regard to the
historical background of the language and other contextual factors such as
the intent of the parties, overall purpose of the contract, representations by
party representatives, or other matter shedding light on the meaning of the
contract term. Having seized on the literalist, textualist position, the court
then views any interpretation beyond a dictionary search as "rewriting."
This analysis begs the question of what is the chicken and what
constitutes the egg by assuming that dictionary definitions of text are the
"true" meaning of the contract term. Ifthe true meaning of the term is that
resulting from the more comprehensive contextual analysis, then it is the
literalist who is "rewriting" the contract by seeking or mandating a narrow
185. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138.
186. The Deni Associates court cited the following: Westchester Fire InsuranceCo. v. City
of Pittsburg,768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991) (involving accidental spraying of insecticide on
bystanders in a manner similar to the facts of the Fogg claim); South CentralBell Telephone Co.
v. Ka-Jon Food Stores, 644 So. 2d 357 (La. 1994) (involving a claim by the phone company that
its underground lines had been damaged by gasoline leaking from the insured's storage tanks); West
American Insurance Co. v. Tufco FlooringEast, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(involving claims by a food manufacturer that the fumes from Tufco's polishing of the claimant's
floor had adversely affected the smell and taste of the chicken, resulting in ruined meals and altered
plans). Reading these cases, one is hard pressed to describe their results in favor of coverage as
based upon any finding of textual ambiguity.
187. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138 (citing American States Ins. Co. v. F.H.S., Inc., 843
F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D. Miss. 1994)). For a discussion of F.H.S., see supra text accompanying
notes 178-81.
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and literal application of the disputed term even though none was intended
by contracting parties. By leapfrogging this more nuanced and difficult
analysis in order to embrace textual literalism at the outset, the Deni
Associates court itself can be said to have rewritten the pollution exclusion
to expand it and work-a rewritten contraction of coverage inconsistent with
the intent of the parties, purpose of the CGL, public policy goals, and
policyholder expectations.
4. Misunderstanding Judicial Role and Potential
Additionally, one might well be suspicious of textual literalism as an
interpretive philosophy because it creates a blatant misuse of resources.
Judges at all levels, but particularly the state supreme court and federal
court levels, are drawn from the highest echelons of the bar. By definition,
these jurists (and most trial and intermediate appellate judges as well) are
persons of demonstrable intellect, skill, and experience. When lawyers of
such talent and experience face an interpretative question, one would
expect them to do more than merely look up a word in the dictionary.
This preference for text (and a particularly stilted reading of text at that)
over context is, of course, the product of the Supreme Court of Florida's
earlier error (widely shared by other courts) of refusing to consider
background information when it finds the text at issue sufficiently clear.
The Supreme Court of Florida applied this rule in its important decision
construing the old "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion."' 8 The
Deni Associates court cited cases taking a similar textually literalist
approach without giving due consideration to the policyholder's contextual
arguments.' 9 When it wanted to discern the meaning of a term, the Deni
Associates court did not wade into the complex but potentially more
rewarding waters of intent, purpose, context, representations, history,
estoppel, and public policy. Instead, the court reached for a dictionary. 9°

188. See Dimnitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700,705 (Fla.
1993), cited in DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1139.
189. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138-39 (citing Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs.,
942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg, 925 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla.
1996); and Bemhart v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
190. See id. at 1139 (using WEBSTER'STHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICrONARYUNABRIDGED
(1981) as a source for meaning of words not defined in the policy). Although, in fairness, I should
add that in this segment of the opinion, the DeniAssociatescourt was largely making the point that
a disputed term is not to be deemed ambiguous merely because it was not defined in the policy
itself, a proposition with which I agree.
But in essence, the court's observation is part of a brief for expectations analysis. The reason
that a contract drafter need not define each term of a contract or insurance policy is not the ready
presence of the dictionary for decoding contract language. Rather, because relatively common terms
read against the intent of the parties and the purpose of the contract in the context of the instrument
and transaction create objectively reasonable expectations, the parties know what the contract
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The court then rejected the policyholders' argument that even if
seemingly clear on its face, the pollution exclusion was latently ambiguous
because its scope became unclear in operation in specific factual situations.
In doing so, the DeniAssociatescourt advanced an unusually narrow view
of the role of latent ambiguity in contract law. Indeed, the court's entire
sense of the notion of contractual ambiguity seems wooden and outdated.
5. Ahistorical Contracts Scholarship
The classic high version of "objective" theory of contract19 ' fell from
favor during the course of the twentieth century. Its excessive faith in the
precision of words and the shared nature and agreement of those reading
words was not helpful for resolving disputed contracts unless there was no
room for doubt as to the meaning of a contract term-not only on paper but
also as applied. If the term is really clear (e.g., "on or before July 1, 1997")
there is no serious dispute as to the meaning of the term and we would all
agree that the contract should be enforced as written rather than as
conveniently misremembered by a party in breach (e.g., "you mean I don't
have until July 15th to make payment?"). But in these cases of linguistic
clarity, the objective theory of contract is almost a trite truism. In a large
array of cases, of course, even relatively clear language becomes unclear
in application and is subject to reasonable dispute even if the term standing
alone is not obviously ambiguous.
For example, a survey researcher asking laypersons on the street the
meaning of "pollution" would probably find the respondents ready with a
quick, succinct, firm, and relatively consistent response: pollution is
degradation of the environment because of the introduction of polluting
material into the environment. This widely held concept of pollution is in
general quite clear but it provides relatively little guidance for determining
whether or not a given CGL policy claim is covered. Unless the court is
willing to engage in sustained analysis of the meaning of a disputed term
through consideration of connotative and contextual factors, party intent,
means without the necessity of cluttering the instrument with a myriad of definitions. Where a term
in an insurance policy is defined, one might in fact be suspicious that the term is being given
something other than its ordinary or common meaning. In any event, it is hard to understand the
court's suggestion that the precise dictionary definition of a word should take precedence over the
connotative meaning of the word. If that were the case, the Supreme Court of Florida would have
ruled differently on the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion at issue in Dimmitt Chevrolet
since the dictionary definition of "sudden" is "unexpected" and does not require a sudden event to
be abrupt.
191. A less lofty version ofthe objective theory of contract might well be helpful by attempting
to interpret disputed language, not only to vindicate the purpose of the agreement and the intent of
the parties, but also by seeking, where possible, to assign to contracts a meaning that is more
universal, more objectively reasonable, and less idiosyncratic and subject to post hoc
rationalization.
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policy purpose, and common sense, it is difficult to accept that words like
the CGL policy "absolute" pollution exclusion can have an objectively
certain meaning.
The objective view of contract must be reconciled first with the reality
that some words have uncertain meanings due to a variety of factors.
Professor Farnsworth has broadly classified the categories of linguistic
uncertainty as: (1) vagueness; (2) ambiguity of term; (3) ambiguity of
syntax; and (4) ambiguity resulting from inconsistent or contradictory
language. 192 Vague words are those not neatly bound but indicating only a
general concept. For example, "the word green is vague as it shades into
yellow at the one extreme and into blue at the other, so that its applicability
in marginal situations is uncertain."' 193 An ambiguous provision in a
contract is one that may have two distinct connotations. "Thus the word
lightis ambiguous when considered in the context of dark feathers."' 94 The
ambiguity may exist because the word itself is capable of different
meanings: e.g., short tons or long tons? Canadian dollars or American
dollars or Hong Kong dollars? Which ship named "Peerless"? 95 Usually,
ambiguity of term can be resolved by reference to contract context. For
example, a contract between two Americans in America involving the sale
of an American-made product to be used in America probably
contemplated payment in American dollars.
Ambiguity of syntax involves uncertainty created by the way otherwise
clear words are put together. Something like the "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion can be seen as evidencing both ambiguity of term
("sudden" has a dictionary definition meaning "unexpected" and one
meaning "abrupt") and ambiguity of syntax (does the pairing of the two
words indicate merely repetition, or a requirement that coverage can exist
only for discharges that are both unintentional and abrupt?). Ambiguity
from inconsistent language takes place when one provision of a contract
is arguably in conflict with another provision of the contract. To this list,
one might add ambiguity caused by shifting context and unexpected
application of the policy to unforeseen circumstances, or what is often
termed "latent" rather than "patent" ambiguity. Even if one adheres to the
objective theory of contract and finds no ambiguity in a term, or the syntax
of the policy, or conflicting provisions of a policy, there remains the issue
of whether policyholders' reasonable expectations might countermand

192. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.8, at 498-501; Farnsworth, supra note 91, at 94042.
193. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.8, at 498.
194. See id.

195. See id. § 7.8, at 498-99. The famous Peerlesscase is Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng.
Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), which held that neither party was held to the other's concept of a particular
ship Peerless.The case involved a classic example of mutual mistake.
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clear policy language.
6. The Court Leaves an "Absurd Result" Escape Hatch-But
Fails to Explain How This Is More Legitimate than
Application of Expectations Analysis
The DeniAssociatescourt attempted to follow the well-known common
law norm of only deciding the case before it when it refused to address
"certain hypothetical situations" that might fit in the pollution exclusion
provision simply because the situation was accompanied by the tangential
presence of chemicals.196 Unfortunately, the court's active oral argument
on this dimension had already illustrated the degree to which the pollution
exclusion is rife for abuse if read in the literal manner championed by the
insurers, 97 and then, ironically, the Deni Associates court. Instead of
continuing on this potentially productive path, testing the contours of the
pollution exclusion, and providing guidance for future courts, the court
turned its back on the illuminating exchanges at oral argument that
demonstrated beyond cavil the problematic nature of a dictionarydetermined adjudication of the pollution exclusion.
To prevent such obvious lurking abuses as the denial of the slip-and-fall
claim where the fall took place because of a bleach or lye spill (discussed
expressly at oral argument), the court stated that despite the literalist
interpretation at work in Deni Associates, "insurance policies will not be
construed to reach an absurd result."' 198 The court's assurance is cold
comfort for a variety of reasons. First, the court suggests no principled
methodology for determining what constitutes an absurd result. Exactly
what is an absurd result? What makes it absurd? Unless these questions
can be answered in a principled manner, presumably the bench would be
acting ultra vires and "rewriting" the contract by refusing to enforce it as
written. The court had stated only a sentence earlier that it would not
rewrite contracts merely because literal language might produce results at
odds with policyholder expectations. If the "absurd result" test is to be used
by the bench, the court must have a workable yardstick for measuring the
absurd.
One possible means of operationalizing the absurd result standard is to
emulate the Deni Associates majority, and reach for a dictionary.
According to the dictionary nearest me when writing this Article (one
advantage of being a nontextualist is that one need not worry about which

196. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140.
197. For discussion on the oral argument in Deni Associates, see text accompanying supra
note 121-26.
198. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140.
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particular dictionary to use)... the adjective "absurd" means: "1:
ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous 2: having no rational
or orderly relationship to human life: Meaningless." 2 °
The almighty dictionary itself regards highly unreasonable acts or
things as absurd. By dictionary definition, then, a contract construction that
violates the reasonable expectations of the policyholder would seem to be
absurd and therefore unenforceable. The DeniAssociates court itself said
this when it embraced the absurd result backstop to literal contract
textualism. But paradoxically, in what can in retrospect be seen as Catch22 logic, the Deni Associates court refused to give any consideration to
policyholder expectations, even though these are clearly relevant to
determining whether a given contract construction produces an absurd
result.
A glance at a thesaurus is even more damning to the word-fixated Deni
Associates court. According to one major thesaurus (again, the one on my
bookshelf at home) synonyms for "absurd" are: "preposterous, ridiculous,
ludicrous, foolish, silly, laughable, crazy, irrational, senseless, pointless,
meaningless, nonsensical, illogical, unreasonable, self-contradictory,
impossible, implausible, outlandish, untenable, unsound, incongruous,
risible, mad, loony; see also stupid."201 Further exposition by the thesaurus
is equally damning: "absurd means laughably inconsistent with what is
judged as true or reasonable [an absurdconclusion]." 2'
In both the dictionary and the thesaurus, absurdity is judged according
to whether a position is reasonable. Things insufficiently reasonable are
absurd. Presumably, something at odds with the objectively reasonable
expectations of one party to a contract at least verges on the absurd,

199. Apparently this is not much of a worry for textualists, either. See Note, Looking It Up:
107 HARV. L.REV. 1437,1438-47 (1994) (observing that
DictionariesandStatutoryInterpretation,
the United States Supreme Court, including noted and self-described textualist Justice Antonin
Scalia, makes apparently random use of different dictionaries defining key terms of statutes, and
then gives legal effect to such terms in accordance with dictionary meaning; the Court made
reference to 27 different dictionaries during 1988-94 period).
200. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIoNARY 5 (10th ed. 1996). The definition
of the adjective absurd continues "also: lacking order or value 3: dealing with the absurd or with
absurdism." As a noun, "absurd" means: "the state or condition in which human beings exist in an
irrational and meaningless universe and in which human life has no ultimate meaning." Id. These
definitions are obviously less helpful to understanding what type of contract construction or
enforcement of literal contract language would be absurd. However, one might consider it more
than a little irrational ifa business purchases liability insurance only to find no coverage from that
liability insurance when the business becomes the target of a more or less conventional lawsuit
against the policyholder growing out of ordinary business operations known to the insurer at the
time the policy was issued.
201. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD THESAURUS 5 (Charlton Laird ed., 3d ed. 1997) (emphasis
added). Antonyms for "absurd" are "sensible, logical, rational." Id.
202. See id. at 5.
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perhaps crossing the line. Thus, like the proverbial vicious circle, the Deni
Associates court has turned back on itself. It wants to prevent the broad
textual boilerplate contained in insurance policies from absurdly stripping
policyholders of coverage, but refuses to engage in the analysis required to
determine in a principled way whether the exclusion sought by the insurer
produces an absurd result: whether the insurer's construction of the policy
is greatly or ridiculously unreasonable.
Like a textualist should, I emphasize the first meaning given in the
dictionary,' which defines absurdity according to its unreasonableness.
However, the secondary definition of absurd-lacking rational or orderly
value-also suggests that the Deni Associates court may have erred in
denying coverage, or at least should have engaged in a more searching,
functional analysis of the insurance policy at issue. Insurance is sold as a
product imparting "peace of mind" to the policyholder: assurance that the
insurer will defend and pay ordinary types of liability claims that threaten
the operation and fiscal health of the business. The insurer's obligation is
subject to the policy limits and other essentially obvious or fair
considerations such as the insured's paying premiums, cooperating, and
providing the insurer truthful information. The rational and orderly
operation of liability insurance would seemingly require that the CGL
policy cover common sources of liability claims and their near cousins.
This is not the case where such claims are clearly and appropriately
excluded by the policy or the context of the insurance transaction-or
perhaps where coverage is dramatically inconsistent with the nature of the
risks assumed by the insurer and the attendant underwriting realities. When
a CGL policy provides no coverage simply because the otherwise
unexceptional tort happens to involve a chemical, the order and rationality
of the "all-risk" insurance policy, an order and rationality fostered by
insurers and customers alike since World War II, is clearly upset, if not
quite eliminated. Denying coverage merely because of the incidental
presence of a pollutant in a claim thus tends toward the absurd.
A second problem of the Deni Associates court's articulation of an
absurd result test for policing contract construction rather than use of
reasonable expectations analysis is that the court suggests that it will not
countenance absurd results-but what about bad results? If it is

203. At least I would think that one who places great legal import in dictionary definitions
would place most emphasis on the first, preferred meaning in the dictionary. But the Supreme Court
of Florida in the second and final Dimmitt Chevrolet decision requiring pollution discharges to be
abrupt in order to be covered under the former "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion spured
the preferred dictionary meaning of "sudden" ("happening or coming unexpectedly"). See Dimmitt
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 705 (Fla. 1993); MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 1176 (10th ed. 1996). For discussion of Dimmit Chevrolet,
see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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permissible to escape the straightjacket of a contextual, isolated word
literalism in order to avoid "absurd" outcomes, why does the court lack
power to escape literalism in order to avoid results that are "bad," "unfair,"
or "unjust?" Why can't the court ensure that contractual arrangements
fulfill their purpose and square with the intent and objectively reasonable
expectations of the parties?
If a court eschews cramped word literalism to avoid absurd results, it
nonetheless is "rewriting" the contract away from its dictionary definition.
According to the textual literalism embraced by the DeniAssociatescourt,
any departure from a word's literal meaning is bad, lawless rewriting. But
if this is true when the nonliteral interpretation is used to achieve a "better"
construction of the contract or to avoid a "bad" or "unfair" interpretation,
it is equally true when done to avoid the "absurd" result.
All lawyers and judges presumably agree that courts should not enforce
contracts so literally as to bring about absurd results. That is the law of
every jurisdiction.2' If this is so, why must a court not only accept, but
embrace, (as did the Deni Associates court) results that may not be
"absurd" but seem clearly bad, unwise, unfair, or inconsistent with the
overall transaction?
In my view, there is no persuasive answer to this question. If it is
permissible to depart from textual literalism where the threatened result is
absurd, it also must be permissible to take a less hidebound approach in
order to prevent "poor" or "unwise" constructions that border on the
absurd and are at odds with the expectations or intent of the parties or their
purpose in contracting. An effective judiciary can unleash itself from
textual literalism to foster wiser contract doctrine without waiting for a
result so bad it qualifies as absurd as a prerequisite for untying its hands.
One response to this criticism that the DeniAssociatesmajority could
make is to note that I am arguing for a departure from textual literalism
when literalism produces unreasonable, unwise, or unfair results in light
of the intent and purpose of the contract at issue. But the court is willing
to depart from textual literalism only when the result would be
"ridiculously unreasonable." A result merely unreasonable or even highly
unreasonable is insufficient in the eyes of the Deni Associates court to
permit anything less than literal and broad construction of the insurance
policy. That view may distinguish the absurd from the merely
unreasonable, but it is a distinction that accomplishes little, save excessive
fidelity to a simplistic school of contract analysis. For decades, the rule of
law has been that exclusions (and other provisions tending to defeat
coverage) in an insurance policy are to be strictly construed against the
204. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, ch. 7. This is also, of course, the law of
Florida. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986);
Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938, 942 (Fla. 1979).
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insurer. 05 Deni Associates turns this rule on its head by construing
exclusionary language broadly in order to defeat coverage, an approach and
result verging on the absurd.
A third problem with the court's rejection of reasonable expectations
analysis, but assurance that the absurd result escape hatch still exists, is the
Deni Associates result itself. Judged by even the high standard and
dictionary definition of "absurd" as "ridiculously unreasonable," it is not
altogether clear that the actual holding of Deni Associates is not absurd.
Justices Wells and Overton saw the broad interpretation of the pollution
exclusion "swallowing" coverage, at least in the DeniAssociatesammonia
blueprint machine spill.2 6 An exception that swallows coverage sounds
uncomfortably close to an absurdity. Judge Klein in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, joined by Judges Polen and Pariente had a similar view.2 7
The trial judge implicitly agreed, and appeared even less hospitable to the
insurers' assessments than did the appellate judges. 8
As discussed in Part V, below, which develops a working definition of
absurdity in the context of insurance coverage, the DeniAssociates result
was more than merely unwise and qualifies as absurd. Although the Fogg
spraying case received a vote for coverage only by the trial judge, the
definition of absurdity drawn from the dictionary, and that developed in
Part IV, suggests that the coverage denial in Fogg was perhaps even less
justified, more "absurd" if you will, than that of Deni Associates.
Reconsider the facts of Deni Associates and Fogg. In DeniAssociates,
the insured's agents knocked over a blueprint machine, spilling ammonia,
which required the clearing of much of an office building.'a 9 Like Justices
Wells and Overton, I regard this not so much as a pollution incident but as
a workplace accident that simply involved chemicals. The presence of a
toxic chemical in a small (but obviously potent) dose as an adjunct to the
company's operations was not enough to convert the matter from a garden
variety tort claim against a business into a pollution claim, even though the
ammonia fumes had a good deal to do with both the claim and the extent
of the damages.
Despite the presence of chemical fumes giving rise to the claims, the
205. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Emerald Fisheries, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980); ALAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 9.01 (3d ed. 1995); STEMPEL, supra

note 1, § 3.42 (1994 and 1998 Supp.).
206. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397,406-07 (4th
DCA 1996) (Klein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd, 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
Fourth District Court of Appeal Judge Barbara Pariente was elevated to the Supreme Court of
Florida in February 1998 and did not participate in the DeniAssociates decision in the supreme
court.

208. See id. at 399-400.
209. See id. at 399.
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common sense observer would easily distinguish between the ammonia
spill in Deni Associates and genuine pollution such as wastewater
discharge on land or water, or smokestack emissions. The fact that the
office building in Deni Associates was evacuated because of fumes is of
relatively little import if the claims are viewed with some perspective.
Agents of Deni Associates might just as easily have caused the building's
evacuation by carelessly starting a fire because of overloading an electric
outlet, or leaving rags in a closet, or discarding a smoldering cigarette into
a wastebasket, or backing a delivery truck into a water main or a key pillar
supporting the building. Thus, the DeniAssociatesclaim does not become
anything really extraordinary merely because of the presence of ammonia.
By contrast, true pollution claims tend to allege long-term, widespread
contamination of a wide area involving persons other than just those in
immediate proximity of the insured tortfeasor (as were the other office
building tenants). Thus, to exclude Deni Associates from the standard
liability coverage sold by State Farm seems not only unreasonable, but
ridiculously unreasonable.
Still, there is the matter of the chemical and its fumes making the
situation worse than if the machine that tipped over had contained
something harmless like water. Despite the cold reception experienced in
the supreme court, the policyholder in Fogg had no greater degree of
"pollution" associated with the liability claims against it. Recall that the
Fogg partnership became liable because its agents erred in conducting crop
spraying and doused two bystanders with Ethion.21 As in DeniAssociates,
the presence of the chemical made things worse than would have been the
case had the plane been spraying water. But the fact remains that cropdusting is what an agricultural insured frequently does as part of its
business-and things can go wrong causing injuries when small aircraft
regularly conduct this process. The helicopter could, for example, have
crash-landed on the bystanders and killed them. The helicopter could have
crashed into a building or school bus. The helicopter could have struck a
powerline, shutting down area businesses and leading to the business
interruption claims reflected in the Deni Associates case. The helicopter
could even have been irrigating from the air and injured the bystanders
with a direct hit of water (a nonpollutant) under high pressure.
Although the actual injuries in Fogg were chemically related, which
undoubtedly accounts for the unanimity against the policyholder
partnership in the high court, there is nothing about the circumstances of
the Fogg injury claims that suggests it be characterized as a "pollution"
claim rather than a mere errant operations claim. For example, if the
partnership's security guard was overzealous in subduing a trespasser with

210. See id.
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MACE, would a reasonable layperson or jurist think of the resulting claim
as one caused by "pollution?" This encroaches upon or enters into the
realm of the unreasonably ridiculous absurd result. Stripping the Fogg
partnership of its CGL policy coverage merely because the errant
helicopter injured with Ethion rather than with its rotors or fuselage is
uncomfortably similar.
As a matter of fairness and construction of the insurance policy as a
whole, one would be remiss unless it was noted that Deni Associates'
insurer must have been at least constructively aware that architects use
drafting machines, which contain ammonia, which can spill and give off
fumes. Yet State Farm insured Deni Associates and never appeared to
disclaim coverage for torts resulting from ordinary business operations,
either through policy language or other communications. Similarly, Farm
Bureau constructively knew that farmers spray crops and it never expressly
disclaimed coverage for crop dusting mishaps. Indeed, Farm Bureau's
refusal to cover a farmer for a crop dusting tort is particularly hard to
justify in light of that insurer's longtime marketing strategy of portraying
itself as the farmer's friend and an insurer that understands the farmer's
business.
B. Deni Associates as a Microcosm of LargerJudicialError
Although Deni Associates is a disastrous opinion, it hardly stands
alone. In their zeal to fend off reasonable expectations analysis, other
courts, like the DeniAssociatescourt, have rendered decisions inconsistent
with other contract principles,2 ' or overlooked available avenues of
resolution that would not require an assault against the reasonable
expectations doctrine.212 Many judges are so adverse to or fearful of
reasonable expectations analysis that they are driven to bad results, through
poor analysis. As noted above,2" 3 much of the criticism of reasonable
expectations analysis, particularly of the Keeton "rights-at-variance" form,
211. See, e.g., Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Idaho 1979) (reversing
earlier case adopting reasonable expectations approach, and strictly enforcing "visible marks"
requirement for burglary insurance claim despite overall nature of policy and no seeming doubt as
to bona tides ofclaim); see also Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912
P.2d 861, 868-69 (Okla. 1996).(citing cases that use expectations analysis only when a contract is
ambiguous). Arguably, this is an unnecessary exercise if ambiguities are to be construed in favor
of the nondrafter.
212. See supra note 155 (discussingAllen v. PrudentialProperty& CasualtyInsurance Co.,
839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), in which the court attempted to refute the legitimacy of expectations
analysis based on highly suspect view that insurance policy forms were approved by insurance
commissioner, which made interpretation of those forms in any manner other than textual literalism
a separation of powers problem).
213. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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asserts that the expectations approach violates a basic principle of
American law: freedom of contract.214 However, as the courts and
commentators embracing the doctrine have noted (and as Keeton observed
in identifying the doctrine), insurance contracting is something less than
the classical libertarian ideal of bargaining and custom-made voluntary
agreement.
As Keeton and others have detailed, insurance contracts are contracts
of adhesion that are standardized and complex. Due to necessity, they are
broadly worded and even "overdrafted" to cover a wide range of potential
events, 21 5 are almost never read prior to the transaction, are seldom read
afterward (unless a coverage dispute arises), and involve contracting
parties frequently having wide disparities of expertise and bargaining
power.216 Even so-called "manuscript" policies are much more the cutting
and pasting of standard ISO terminology than they are any novel contract
language independently generated by the parties. Consequently, a rigid
view of the power of the dictionary definition of policy text seems
misplaced in the insurance context.
Furthermore, reasonable expectations analysis hardly guts the generally
textualist formality of contract and insurance law. Even in its strongest
rights-at-variance form, the Keeton concept of reasonable expectations
analysis places heavy emphasis on policy text and surrounding
circumstances. The policyholder does not prevail, particularly when text
is clear, unless contextual factors strongly favor the policyholder's
understanding of the insurance coverage. Mere policyholder hope and
whim is not enough to gain coverage. There must be an objectively
reasonable expectation of coverage before the policyholder may prevail.
The point of a contract regime in a liberal democracy is to permit.
parties to arrange their affairs as they wish subject to other needs of the
society and to ensure that parties are not coerced into involuntary
arrangements. The point is not to venerate contract text or dictionary

214. Two sources making this argument at length and with considerable force are: Baker,
supra note 4, at 17-23; Ware, Comment, supra note 4, at 1487-93.
215. Insurers have admitted to "overdrafting" policy language in order to cast an exclusionary
net so wide that it cannot be linguistically avoided--but also have stated that literal enforcement
of such "overdrafted" exclusions was not intended by insurers where the claim did not fall within
the purpose of the exclusions. See, e.g., Texas State Bd. of Ins., Transcriptof Proceedings: Hearing
to Consider, Discuss, and Act on Commercial General Liability Policy Forms Filed by the Insurance
Services Office, Inc., Bd. Dkt. No. 1472 (Oct. 30, 1985), Vol. I, at 6-10, excerpted in part in
STEMPEL,supranote 1, at 116-18 (Supp. 1998) (detailing insurance representatives description of
the "absolute" pollution exclusion as "overdrafted" but that insurers would not seek to deny
coverage on all claims that incidently involved an irritant or toxic substance).
216. Much of this-but not all-holds true even where the policyholder is large, wealthy, and
commercially "sophisticated". See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated"
PolicyholderDefense in Insurance Coverage Litigation,42 DRAKE L. REV. 801, 931-57 (1993).
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definitions in and of themselves. Insurance contracting, even more than
most modem contracting, is not totally free, and perhaps not very free at
all. Even outside of the insurance context, the government (including
legislatures, executive agencies, and courts) is widely regarded as having
the power to void or refuse to enforce contract provisions that are illegal,
unconscionable, or otherwise at odds with public policy.2" 7 Additionally,
human activity is generally widely regulated in modem society, with the
operation of the insurance industry perhaps more regulated than most
commercial activity this side of the securities or food and drug laws. Thus,
the real world of contract and insurance is not one of unfettered discretion
of the contracting parties.
The question then becomes: what should the law provide under these
circumstances? One persuasive defense of the reasonable expectations
doctrine is that it simply adds another interpretive tool for construing
contracts so that courts are not required to completely strike contract terms
that are unfair if read literally. Similarly, the reasonable expectations
approach provides an alternative to simplistic application of a strong form
of contraproferentem,and also provides the courts with a route other than
simplistic enforcement of policy text whose meaning is suspect or tending
toward the absurd when applied literally to the context of the dispute."' l
Viewed from this realistic perspective, reasonable expectations
analysis--even in its strongest rights-at-variance form-is not precluded
by the legal system's treatment of contracting autonomy. Milder versions
of reasonable expectations analysis as a tool for determining insurance
policy meaning are perfectly consistent with the freedom of contract ethos.
Accurate determination of contract meaning enhances party autonomy and
the value of contract rather than diminishing it.
Furthermore, the expectations approach is well grounded in standard
contract doctrine, although this seems frequently forgotten by courts and
commentators resisting the reasonable expectations principle. A halfcentury ago, Arthur Corbin listed as his first black letter pronouncement of
the law of contracts that "the Main Purpose of Contract Law is the
' Corbin
Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises."219
observed:
The law does not attempt the realization of every expectation
that has been induced by a promise; the expectation must be
a reasonable one. Under no system of law that has ever
existed are all promises enforceable. The expectation must be
one that most people would have; and the promise must be

217. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 7.1.
218. See Fett, Note, supra note 54, at 1113-14.
219. ARTHUR C. CORBIN, THE LAW oFCONTRAcrS § 1, at 1 (1950) (One Volume Edition).
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one that most people would perform. This necessarily leads to
a complexity in the law, to the construction of the various
rules determining the circumstances under which a promise is
said to be enforceable and those under which its performance
will be excused.
... Reasonableness is no more absolute in character than
is justice or morality.22
Of course, thorny questions remain regarding whose expectations
should control, and in determining the actual content of expectations, as
well as the degree to which expectations are belied by or trumped by policy
language and other factors surrounding a disputed term. But resolving
these sorts of questions is the essence of adjudicative activity. By disputing
this, the critics of expectations analysis are in reality arguing that
comprehensive judicial construction of written instruments somehow
violates freedom of contract. On the contrary, the existence of volitional
contracting depends upon having a court system that can resolve the
inevitably arising disputes over meaning by rendering decisions that do
more than look up the disputed term in a dictionary.
Unfortunately, however, even the best discussions of the reasonable
expectations doctrine appear to have tacitly assumed that contract law
outside of insurance is highly textual, and that textual meaning is rather
clear and certain. Once this assumption is made (or unconsciously brought
to the analysis at the outset), reasonable expectations analysis seems more
of a departure and hence less legitimate. Reasonable expectations then
becomes something of a "radical" doctrine that cannot be fully embraced.
Courts taking this view further exacerbate the practical problem of
interpreting insurance policies by tending not to use reasonable
expectations analysis in matters where there is no sufficiently clear text
that can be "painstakingly studied" to determine the meaning of the policy.
Meaning can only be derived from context, with a functional view of the
policy in question and its intended purpose. Logically, the parties'
expectations shed light on policy meaning just as this information sheds
light on the meaning of non-insurance contracts. But this potential use of
reasonable expectations analysis is truncated by adverse reaction to the
"rights at variance" form of expectations analysis.
However, if contract law is properly understood, historically and
correctly, as permitting substantial use of nontextual factors in resolving
interpretative issues, the reasonable expectations principle crystallizes as
an important, but hardly radical, addition to the interpretative tools
available to the courts. Although much contract law scholarship and

220. Id. at 2.
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precedent has stressed the textual and formal,221 an at least equally weighty
and persuasive body of case law and analysis has promoted the broader
view more hospitable to the reasonable expectations doctrine.222 As
previously discussed,22 3 the broader, functionalist view, frequently
associated with Professors Corbin and Farnsworth, appears to have gained
ascendancy in the years after World War II and culminating in the Second
Restatement,224 although the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed something

221. See, e.g., SAMUELWZIuSTONATREATISEONTHELAWOFCONTRACr (original ed. 1936;
4th ed. 1990 and supplements).
222. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 219, § 1; FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.11. Although
frequently regarded as more formalist than Farnsworth, modem contracts scholars and treatise
authors Calamari and Perillo appear to weigh in more on the Corbin and Farnsworth side of the
debate and against Williston. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 47
(1970). In discussing "Standards of Interpretation," the authors state "there is no 'lawyers'
Paradise' where 'all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning,"' id. at 89, setting off the
authors' perspective from those of evidence expert James Bradley Thayer, a Harvard Law faculty
contemporary of contract law formalist Samuel Williston. See id. at 89 n.2 (citing JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 428-29 (1898)).

Although the theme of his study is largely that realism did not completely supplant formalism
as the dominant paradigm in American legal thought, English scholar Neil Duxbury describes the
American legal community as evolving during the 20th century toward a less text-centered
jurisprudence where "word-worship" was to a large extent attacked or even belittled. See DUXBURY,
supra note 88, at 119-21.
223. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS (1981); SCHABER & ROHWER, supra note 87,

§ 88, at 147 (authors of basic contract law text designed as primer and study aid for first-year law
students state that "[o]ne purpose of contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations of
persons who become parties to a bargain"). The Schaber and Rohwer view is in part premised on
the work of earlier scholars who identified an "expectation interest" in contract performance. See,
e.g., LON FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW ch. 5 (5th ed. 1990);
FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS

(3d ed. 1986).

In particular, Schaber and Rohwer observe that "[t]here is nothing wrong with 'plain meaning'
and it may be a satisfactory answer to interpretations questions in some cases, but the problem may
be more difficult than this expression indicates." SCHABER &ROHWER, supra note 87, at 148. They
also note that even under the purportedly formalist or textualist views of Williston and the First
Restatement, for which Williston served as reporter, a number of nontextual factors were proffered
as interpretative tools where the contract text at issue was not indisputably clear. See id. at 150-53.
The approach of Corbin, Farnsworth, and the Second Restatement was more oriented to the parties
actual and subjective meaning and did not seek an "objective" meaning for contract terms, as had
Williston.
If this view is regarded as correctly summarizing the evolution of contract law in the 20th
century, then the only real departure provided for insurance under the strong version of the Keeton
"rights at variance" approach is that in cases of arguable unilateral mistake, where the policyholder
has not read or thought about portions of the policy language, the insurer's intended meaning will
not control if this violates the insured's reasonable expectation. In fact, using the Keeton approach
in these situations may be completely consistent with Restatement § 201(2)(b), which prevents one
party's intended meaning from controlling if that party had "reason to know" that the other party
may have had a different understanding. This is hardly a farfetched scenario in the context of
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of a formalist revival, particularly in the United States Supreme Court.2 '
However, this formalist recidivism,226 one largely decried by
commentators, 227 hardly suggests the absence of a place for reasonable
expectations analysis at contract law's figurative table.228
The notion of freedom of contract has been rhetorically oversold.229
Similarly, the notion that contracting parties, even the drafter, choose all
words in a contract carefully and with a specific intent is hopelessly wrong
much of the time. Consequently, judicial scrutiny of contracts to ensure a
reasonable construction hardly seems like the conduct of a rogue judiciary
intent on rampaging outside its boundaries to impose on litigants
agreements they never made. Undoubtedly, parties losing a contract dispute
will make such charges whenever an adjudication requires more
performance than they were willing to give under their interpretation of the

insurance law.
225. See Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 61-75 (1995)
(viewing recent Supreme Court decisions as formalist and rendered as if Court was "blinded by a
thick fog of free market rhetoric"); G. Richard Shell, Contractsin the Modem Supreme Court, 81
CAL. L. REV. 431 (1990) (finding Supreme Court contract cases of the 1980s governed by
unrealistically rigid textualism, formalism, and insensitivity to pragmatic policy concerns); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, BootstrappingandSlouchingTowardGomorrah:ArbitralInfatuationandtheDecline
of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1412-17 (1996) (criticizing Court's interpretation of
arbitration clauses in contracts as adopting erroneous view of objective meaning and reasonable
reach of contract language).
226. Although the standard "story" of the march of 20th century American jurisprudence is
ofa trek away from formalism and toward functionalism, recent scholarship has persuasively argued
that modem American legal thought has engaged in a protracted, and probably perpetual, tug-of-war
between these schools of thought-something considerably more complex than a "pendulum
swing" alternating between periods of formalist and functionalist dominance. See DUXBURY, supra
note 89, at 2-5; see also id.at 10 (finding the realist revolt against formalism was "by no means as
straightforward as some commentators have cared to suggest"); id. at 21 (even disciples of highly
formalist 19th century Harvard Law Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell (such as Samuel
Williston) found Landell's approach too narrow); id. at 47 (progressive judges such as Benjamin
Cardozo exhibited both formalist and functionalist traits); id. at 55 (noting Harvard Law Dean
Roscoe Pound's professed sociological jurisprudence attacking as "mechanicar' jurisprudence the
high formalism of Langdell); id. at 60 (stating that Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes were both
formalist and anti-formalist); id.at 301-419 (noting that the modem "law and economics"
movement has elements of both formalism and functionalism); see also STANLEYFISH,THERE'SNO
SUCHTHNG AS FREE SPEECHANDIT'S AGOODTHING,TOO 156-68 (1994) (discussing "Contract's
Two Stories," regarding the nature and adequacy of consideration as an example of ongoing
tensions in the law).
227. See sources supra note 232. See generally Symposium, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(containing articles by a variety of authors discussing aspects of Grant Gilmore's 1975 book, The
DeathofContract,with most authors criticizing the United States Supreme Court's recent approach
of rigid style textualism and formalism).
228. See SCHABER & ROHwER, supra note 87, § 6, at 11 ("Contract law is concerned with
protection of the reasonable expectations of the parties").
229. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
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agreement. At most, however, a bad decision in this regard is just that: a
bad decision. Construing a contract to require more than the losing party
wanted to give is notjudicial activism any more than it is judicial activism
to construe an exclusion in an insurance policy more broadly than a
policyholder wanted, thus eliminating coverage. An adjudicatory approach
does not become uneven or quasi-legislative simply because the court uses
additional factors to determine contract meaning.
Rather than continue to debate the merits of the reasonable expectations
concept itself, or to argue over whether express consideration of the
parties' reasonable expectations adds anything to traditional ambiguity
analysis in which the contract drafter always loses if the wording is not
sufficiently clear, courts should take a more comprehensive look at the role
of policyholder and insurer expectations. Specifically, courts should
examine the degree to which those expectations enhance the contextual
base for interpreting insurance policies. The objectively reasonable
expectations of both the policyholder and the insurer (and beneficiaries and
other interested parties such as a lender or guarantor) should routinely be
consulted in order to provide the background context for determining the
meaning of a disputed policy term. There is no compelling reason for
courts to myopically focus only on policy text and to affirmatively avoid
appreciating the connotation and context of the policy. Major indicators of
such policy meaning are the objectively reasonable expectations of the
parties, and even the subjective expectations of the parties.
In many cases, use of reasonable expectations analysis can assist the
court in determining whether policy language can or should be read
literally-or whether a dictionary definition is accurate for use in gauging
the meaning of a word as used by the contracting parties. For example,
does a policy term disclaiming coverage for anything "related to" the
"release" of a "pollutant" bar coverage for a claim by a third party whose
car skids on a puddle of oil negligently left on the road by a passing truck?
In this case, courts unwilling to give literal application to such a broad
exclusion should prefer to incorporate expectations into the analysis rather
than arguing at length about the degree to which the pollution exclusion
should be read literally or whether it is ambiguous.
When courts reject the potential utility of reasonable expectations
analysis they are left with an artificially bipolar choice of either reading the
language literally, or broadly, in the wooden manner of a dictionary. In the
case of the pollution exclusion, this expands the exclusion and limits
coverage. But in other instances (e.g., the meaning of "damages"), a
dictionary-oriented approach has the effect of expanding coverage, even if
the parties may have intended or expected a more narrow meaning that
restricted the concept of damages to judgments for monetary relief in court
rather than anything that entails an expenditure of funds.
The absolute pollution exclusion is an example of the type of insurance
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policy provision for which courts should apply even-handed reasonable
expectations analysis, not so much as a counterweight to clear text but as
a prerequisite to determining the meaning of words and the possible
ambiguity of words.30 This use of reasonable expectations as background
context would be applied as part of the process of determining whether
language is clear or ambiguous and whether language should be read
literally (even hyperliterally) or with greater breadth. Courts would
generally, however, consider not only the dictionary definition of words,
but also their connotative value, particularly the connotative value in light
of the purpose of the contract, the setting, and the identity of the parties. If
assessment of both text and context does not provide a clear meaning for
the disputed term, the expectations of, and consequences to, both insurer
and policyholder become an important factor in deciding whether to give
the benefit of the doubt to the policyholder or to the insurer.231

230. Two recent cases provide good examples of the proper use of this form of reasonable
expectations analysis to resolve pollution exclusion controversies, even though neither court
emphasized the reasonable expectations aspects of its decisions.
In Western Alliance InsuranceCo. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1997), andAmerican States
InsuranceCo.v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d72 (Ill. 1997), the highest courts ofMassachusetts and Illinois
both determined that the absolute pollution exclusion does not bar coverage for claims related to
negligence resulting in carbon monoxide poisoning simply because carbon monoxide is a dangerous
gas, and as such falls within the literal reach of the pollution exclusion. The exclusion states that
it excludes liability claims related to any "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of pollutants," with pollutants defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant
or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste." Gill, 686
N.E.2d at 999 n.4.
In Koloms, the Illinois Supreme Court faced a situation where the claim was against an insured
landlord for failure to properly maintain a building furnace which emitted the carbon monoxide
fumes that caused the injuries resulting in the claim. See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 74. Examining the
background, history, and purpose of the exclusion, the Koloms court determined that the
exclusion-despite its broad literal language-was intended only to bar coverage for the traditional
sort of waste discharge and diffuse contamination ordinarily thought of as pollution. See id. at 7879. Claims for the type of injuries traditionally arising from nonpolluting forms of insured
negligence were not to be excluded. See id. at 79. Hence, despite the linguistic breadth of the
exclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court limited the reach of the exclusion in order to render a
coverage determination it viewed as more consistent with the purpose of the CGL policy and the
exclusion, as well as the intent of the drafters. See id.
The Massachusetts court stated that the absolute pollution exclusion "should not reflexively be
applied to accidents arising during the course of normal business activities simply because they
involve a 'discharge, dispersal, release or escape' of an 'irritant or contaminant."' Gill, 686 N.E.2d
at 999. Following this analysis, and confronted with a claim by a restaurant patron who suffered
carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of poor ventilation at the restaurant, the Gill court found
coverage was not thwarted by the exclusion or the contaminant's role in bringing about the injury.
See id. at 1000-01. In short, Gill and Koloms demonstrate the usefulness of reasonable expectations
thinking in fairly resolving a thorny interpretative problem that has to date divided the state courts,
and cost millions of dollars in litigation expenses.
231. Other indicia of contract meaning could be weighed along with the expectations of the
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As the foregoing discussion suggests, the reasonable expectations
concept has substantial utility even if it is not asserted in its strong form of
overcoming explicit policy provisions. Courts can use reasonable
expectations thinking to provide a more nuanced approach to contract
interpretation than the traditionally crude two-step of consulting the
dictionary and invoking contraproferentem where dictionary definitions
are deemed ambiguous. Reasonable expectations analysis provides both a
check against absurd hyperliteralism (e.g., the slip-and-fall claim excluded
because the slippery liquid on the floor falls within the technical linguistic
reach of the policy definition of "pollutant"), and an alternative to routinely
ruling against the insurer whenever the language is something less than
inarguably clear. Similarly, the reasonable expectations concept can be
significantly more sensible than traditional contra proferentem in
calibrating the amount of coverage or other relief available to the
policyholder.232

parties, such as:
* The overall purpose of the contract, and whether a particular interpretation of
the disputed term better serves that purpose;
" The identity of the drafter;
* The degree of ambiguity, and whether the ambiguity was inevitable or was the
result of poor drafting that could have been improved;
0 Whether the term is unconscionable, unfair, or surprising if construed in a
particular manner;
* Any classic "parol" or"extrinsic" evidence (and, despite frequent confusion, the
two terms are not strictly synonymous) that illuminates the parties' intent or
specific subjective expectations (not to be confused with the objectively
reasonable expectations that will be used as part ofthe background context to help
assess the meaning of the four corners of the policy); and
0 Any factors supporting promissory or equitable estoppel against one or more of
the parties.
To the extent that this sort of comprehensive inquiry does not resolve the issue, a court should
be permitted to make an express consideration of public policy issues and whether those
considerations compel a particular construction in close cases. Factors to consider would include
not only the perceived need for defense and indemnity by the policyholder, but also the impact on
insurance markets. Issues of solvency, notice, and stability should be permitted consideration by
the court-but only in the closest cases where standard contract principles fail to bring resolution.
Given the power held by insurers over contract language and structure, public policy issues
affecting the insurer or the insurance industry should not be given significant consideration unless
the more traditional interpretative factors listed above fail to resolve the dispute. In short, the
reasonable expectations of the parties should be expressly recognized as one of the by-nowconventional contract principles utilized by courts in deciding contract disputes, particularly
insurance policy coverage actions.
232. Unfortunately, the Florida Department of Insurance, although supporting coverage for
Deni Associates arid the Fogg partnership, rejected this assessment and argued in its amicus brief
in Deni Associates that Florida should reject reasonable expectations analysis and rely only upon
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The conventional approach that refuses to consider reasonable
expectations (or any extrinsic matter) unless the disputed term is
ambiguous on its face has it backwards. Ambiguity can only be accurately
determined to exist or not exist after the relevant nontextual factors are
considered as well. "Pollution" may mean something in Setting 1 and
something quite different in Setting 2. Consequently, it is not surprising
that courts have generally moved away from the traditional rule and permit
nontextual matter
to assist the court in determining whether text is
3
ambiguous 3
Viewed from this perspective, use of the reasonable expectations
inquiry to assess text is not anti-textual; it seeks to give the text its correct
meaning rather than crucify it on the cross of hyper-literalism. Similarly,
reasonable expectations analysis does not denigrate the intent of the parties
or the purpose of the contract. Rather, the reasonable expectations inquiry
seeks to vindicate party intent and contract purpose. Consequently-and
contrary to much of the traditional wisdom-the reasonable expectations
approach serves the concepts of freedom of contract and market
transaction. In the cases already identified by Judge Keeton-unfair
surprise or unconscionable advantage-an objective reasonable
expectations assessment serves to inform the court as to what is fair and
conscionable, and thus fills the "gap" created by unenforceable text in a
principled way.
If the courts are too reverent toward text and too hesitant to utilize

the traditional contra proferentem rule and absurd result rules in resolving insurance coverage
disputes. See Deni Assoc., 711 So. 2d at 1140 n.4. According to the department brief "[a]dopting
the reasonable expectations doctrine will negate the traditional construction guidelines and create
greater uncertainty. This Court should not resort to the reasonable expectations doctrine because
it will only spawn more litigation to determine the parties' expectations." Id. Like the Deni
Associates court, the insurance department apparently misunderstood the reasonable expectations
doctrine and erroneously believed that expectations analysis requires an adjudication as to the actual
subjective expectations of the litigant insured.
In retrospect, of course, the department's position was tactically unwise. It provided the court
with the opportunity to assert that even the department charged with protecting insureds opposed
reasonable expectations analysis. But the Deni Associates result illustrates just how poorly
"traditional construction guidelines" protect insureds in the hands of the current Supreme Court of
Florida.
Apart from its miscues in the Deni Associates case, the department's position is wrong in a
greater sense. On more than a few occasions, insurance policy language is ambiguous, but the
insured could have no expectation of coverage. In such cases, the insurer should not lose merely
because it had the misfortune to draft an unclear provision, and the insured should not win when
it has no expectation or clear contractual right to coverage.
233. See Abraham,supra note 40, at 539-40; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage, 442 P.2d 641,645 (Cal. 1968) (frequently cited as an example of modem trend of courts
considering extrinsic matter as an aid to determining whether written contract language is
ambiguous).
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rights-at-variance reasonable expectations, the courts become accomplices
in enforcing illusory "bargains." Although the standardized insurance form
contract does not easily fit within the historical bargain theory, z34 it can be
said that in purchasing the form policy (and perhaps a relatively
customized pack of endorsements), the policyholder has "bargained" for
a certain level of coverage, protection, and financial security. Even where
the policy text might be read literally or broadly to alter such a bargain and
its accompanying expectations, the policyholder should not suffer. At some
point, the Anglo-American reverence for text is required to yield to the
greater systemic desire that contracts be enforced to meet the intent of the
parties. Similarly, the insurer has committed to a given level of protection
against fortuitous events in return for a calculated premium. Except when
expectations analysis is inapposite, the insurer's bargain also should be
respected rather than routinely undermined because the insurer did a
suboptimal job of drafting policy language.
V. THE REMNANTS OF REASON: A METHOD FOR
APPLYING THE ABSURD RESULT TEST TO
FUTURE INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES

After Deni Associates, the reasonable expectations concept is not
available-either at the threshold or as a tiebreaker-to assist the court in
resolving difficult coverage questions caused by technically clear but
complex, contextual, or competing terms in an insurance policy. The
resulting insurance and contract law of Florida is accordingly
impoverished, although perhaps not destitute. As noted above, the court
stated that in the future it would not apply textual literalism to reach an
absurd result.235 In other words, the pollution exclusion and other
exclusions presumably will not be given a dictionary-like and broad
application if the effect is to deny coverage in cases were coverage seems
indisputably apt.
Despite the problems of the absurd result standard of contract
construction and its relative inferiority to reasonable expectations analysis,
the absurd result backstop still can provide a means of avoiding the worst
pitfalls of the textual-literal approach. But the question remains: What is
an absurd result? How may it be defined and applied? As discussed above,
the dictionary defines an unreasonable result as one that is "ridiculously

234. See generally Edward A. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain
Hypothesis:AnIntroduction,5 AKRONL.REV. 1 (1972) (noting that standard form contracting does
not meet the bargain model of contract formation and that methods of interpretation developed for
traditional contracts with bargained-for terms may be inapt for interpreting disputed standardized

contracts).
235. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1140.
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' Despite a strong argument that the coverage denials
unreasonable."236
in
Deni Associates were ridiculous, the court was implicitly unpersuaded. If
it had engaged in an inquiry as to reasonableness, it may well have found
the insurer's interpretation unreasonable, but not ridiculously so. A
subsequent case somewhat morejarring than DeniAssociatesmight qualify
as a ridiculously unreasonable denial of coverage. Although the Deni
Associates case itself appeared to close the door to a reasonableness
analysis, one can make a compelling case that the reasonableness of a
coverage denial must be assessed in order to determine whether the result
sought by either litigant is "absurd."
Another means of assessing whether a result is unreasonable is
suggested by the Deni Associates dissent: It is absurd when an exclusion
vitiates too greatly the mainstream coverage that would otherwise be
available. 37 But this standard is problematic because it requires the
reviewing court to agree upon exactly what is to be provided by
mainstream CGL or other insurance coverage. Also, this eminently
reasonable-sounding yardstick offered by Justices Wells and Overton failed
to prompt the other justices to see the compelling nature of Deni
Associate's claim for insurance coverage. It even failed to help Justices
Wells and Overton realize the degree to which the Fogg partnership had a
compelling argument for liability coverage for the claims arising from the
spraying mishap.
My own suggestion for a working yardstick for applying the absurd
result standard in policing insurance controversies is this:

An absurd result ensues when an insurance policy
exclusion, if read literally, or construed broadly, would
preclude coverage in situations where the claims arise for
relatively common mishaps in the course of the insured's
normal operations and where the nature of the underlying
claim does not fundamentally fit the purpose for which the
exclusion was incorporated into the policy.
Literal or broad construction of a policy provision either
to create or to deny coverage creates an absurd result where
the resulting decision is negated by the objectively reasonable
expectations of either insurer or insured, or where finding
coverage is inconsistent with the purpose of the insurance
arrangement, the function of insurance, or public policy.238

236. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
237. See DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1141 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. Even in situations where requested coverage runs counter to the reasonable expectations
of the insurer and is not supported by the policyholder's objectively reasonable expectations, the
policyholder still may obtain coverage if the factual circumstances of the dispute present a case of
waiver, equitable estoppel, or promissory estoppel. In the rare case where the insurer and the
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Overlooking Deni Associates as an isolated, erroneous decision, one
could apply this functional definitiofi of the absurd result test to assess the
types of cases that have already arisen in connection with the CGL policy
pollution exclusion or which might be anticipated. Consider a suit against
a landlord or a furnace installer or service person for carbon monoxide
poisoning. Although carbon monoxide is a deadly gas, one that "pollutes"
or "irritates" its victims to death, the better reasoned cases have ruled that
the absolute pollution exclusion does not bar liability coverage for such
claims. The insurer must defend and indemnify its policyholder when it
faces such claims. 239 These decisions have not rested upon the reasonable
expectations doctrine as such, but have interpreted the pollution exclusion
in light of party intent and contract purpose.
These decisions also could be supported under an absurd result
standard. It would be ridiculously unreasonable to deny coverage to the
landlord whose tenants dies from carbon monoxide poisoning due to a
defective furnace when the landlord is clearly covered for deaths related to
a fire, failure to provide adequate security, or food poisoning (if the
landlord is a dormitory or extended care facility). All of these causes have
just as much potential to kill or injure tenants en masse. The claim against
the insured is not one of "pollution" liability, even though the agent of
injury meets the definition of "pollutant." Denying coverage for carbon
monoxide claims also produces an absurd result because such claims
clearly were covered prior to the revision of the pollution exclusion;
however, there was no announcement of a change in the scope of the CGL
policy and the understanding of the parties regarding coverage.
Similarly, where the insured is a contractor installing a product or
constructing a building, coverage should be available for claims against the
insured even if the claim in part relates to chemical irritants. For example,
a floor may be installed in a new home and the owner may have an allergic
reaction to fumes given off by grout used in the tile. The same could occur
due to odor given off by paint, insulation, or wallpaper glue. In all these
cases, it would be unreasonably ridiculous for the insurer to deny
coverage."' All of these hypothetical insureds are being sued for matters
policyholder both have objectively reasonable but conflicting expectations, the policyholder's
expectations should take precedence.
239. See, e.g., Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1995)
(applying New York law); Regional Bank of Colo., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d
494 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Colorado law); American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms 687 N.E.2d 72
(111. 1997); Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1997).
240. See, e.g., Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037 (7th
Cir. 1992) (applying either Missouri or Illinois law as indistinguishable on this point); Karroll v.
Atomergic Chemetals Corp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1993) (pollution exclusion does not bar coverage
for claims by worker squirted with sulfuric acid in workplace accident). But a significant number
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arising out of their isolated provision of specific services normally
encompassed by the CGL insurance policy.
For example, the tile installer would be covered if the patron slipped on
improperly installed tile and sued. It is absurd to suggest that the tile
installer who is not negligent but merely has the bad luck to use grout that
irritates the patron has no coverage, while the negligent installer is fully
covered. The pollution exclusion was never designed to preclude episodic
claims against commercial entities arising out of ordinary job activities.
Further, the nature of these claims does not involve the long-tail, longlatency, insidious operation, and wide dispersal that made pollution claims
so threatening to the actuarial calculations of the insurance industry, and
spawned the redrafting of the pollution exclusion into its current
"absolute" form.
Similarly, the manufacturers of grout, paint, insulation, glue, and the
like should be covered under this standard. The normal and proper
application of the insured's product is not "pollution" except in the most
unusual and extreme of circumstances. Denying coverage to the paint
manufacturer for allergic reaction is ridiculously unreasonable. Cases
involving lead poisoning claims arising out of children's ingestion of paint
chips support this point. Although exclusions expressly disclaiming
coverage for lead poisoning claims present more difficult problems and
have been upheld by courts, the pollution exclusion alone should not be
considered sufficient to preclude lead poisoning claims directed at the paint
manufacturer. Paint-at least to the normal observer-is not a pollutant
and is not considered "released" or "discharged" when flakes of it are
chewed on by curious youngsters, or when the vapors naturally given off
from installation give rise to claims. 24 '
In attempting to flesh out a working definition of the "absurd result"
principle of contract construction in the wake of Deni Associates, one
struggles with the inherent circularity of the exercise. To determine what
is absurd, one must consider what is reasonable-but Deni Associates
suggests, to paraphrase Mae West, that reason has nothing to do with the
matter. Perhaps given time to reflect, and review of a more sympathetic
case (although both DeniAssociatesand Fogg were sympathetic cases for
of courts have supported absurd interpretations of the pollution exclusion. See, e.g., American
States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1996) (policyholder not covered for claim based
on paint fumes); Vance v. Sukup, 558 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (lead paint poisoning
claims excluded).
241. See, e.g., Technical Coating Applicators, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No.
5:96CV221-RH (N.D. Fla. 1996), appealpending,No. 97-2448 (11th Cir.).
Put another way, would any reasonable person whose child had just eaten paint off the wall, or
insulation pulled from between sheetrock, refer to the incident as a release or discharge of the
ingested material? When textual literalism diverges too greatly from the real world, literalism
deserves little force as an interpretative tool of contract construction.
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the policyholder), the court will appreciate the importance of reasonable
expectations analysis to effective policing of contract language to avoid
absurd results, even if the court continues to reject the reasonable
expectations doctrine in its rights-at-variance form advocated by Judge
Keeton.
Unless the court is willing to look beyond the dictionary to decide
future cases, the absurd result yardstick set forth in Deni Associates
becomes either dead letter or a matter of a future majority's "gut" feeling.
Neither result appropriately serves the causes of contract and insurance
law.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most apt assessment of the Deni Associates opinion is
borrowed from a most unlikely source, Marlon Brando's character in "On
the Waterfront," who delivered the memorable "I coulda been a contender"
line in a soliloquy in which he recalled days of being on the verge of
boxing excellence only to have been seduced by the path of least resistance
toward a life of petty thuggery rather than championship pugilism.242 The
Deni Associates opinion, through the certified question regarding the
reasonable expectations of insurers and policyholders, presented the
Supreme Court of Florida with a direct and timely opportunity to make a
reflective assessment of the reasonable expectations concept, and to move
in the doctrinal direction of making contracts (including insurance policies)
fulfill their purpose. But instead of becoming a serious contender in the
ongoing national debate over the role of reasonable expectations in
insurance matters, the Supreme Court of Florida in Deni Associates
rendered a hidebound hymn to an unrealistic and (one hopes) outdated
contract textualism, perhaps to a word literalism that never existed, even
for formalists like Samuel Williston and Joseph Beale.243 In the ring of

242. See ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954).
243. Williston, of course, was the century's leading contracts scholar prior to Corbin's
ascendancy and is generally seen as more of a textualist and formalist than currently prominent
contract law experts such as E. Alan Farnsworth. Beale, a professor at Harvard Law School during
the early 20th century "was a special target" of the legal realists. See BAILEY KUKIN &JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 153-54 (1994):
Beale was a conflict of laws scholar who advocated the "lex loci delicti" theory
under which the state in which an injury occurred provided the applicable
substantive law for adjudicating the dispute-with no ifs, ands, or buts. Although
the basic lex loci rule seems sensible as a presumption or consideration, Beale
venerated it as an ironclad rule. For example, if a California plaintiff and a New
York defendant crashed on a New Hampshire road, New Hampshire law would
apply to all aspects of the case, even to questions of damages. Beale and his ultraformalism thus became a lightning rod for the Realist's criticisms, and even their
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jurisprudential conflict, few contenders have hit the canvas with such a
thump. The DeniAssociatesopinion ushers in a disquieting era of contract
and insurance law. This is true not only for the ten million residents of
Florida, but others who in the future find their contract rights subdued as
a result of the influence of DeniAssociates and similar precedent, making
contract meaning subject to the unrealistic and unreasonable formalism,
insurer favoritism, and corresponding misunderstanding of insurance
agreements.

ridicule. Some members of the Yale Law faculty even penned a mocking poem
about Beale and posted it in the faculty lounge, blush. A closer examination of
developments in these states illustrates the competing views of reasonable
expectations analysis and draws into sharp relief the frequent misunderstandings
that have hindered the doctrine's development.
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